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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A. PREFACE  
Containing approximately 2200 personnel, the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) 
is the Marine Corps’ deployed force tasked to respond to contingencies worldwide.  Each 
MEU is composed of the personnel and assets the MEU commander determines he 
requires to meet the missions for which it might be tasked while deployed.  Because of 
this, there are differences in composition between each of the MEUs.  For instance, one 
difference might center on how a MEU is provided contracting support.  The purpose of 
this thesis is to examine these differences and to make recommendations for optimization 
of internal contracting support.    
B. BACKGROUND  
 
When the Marine Corps deploys, it deploys as task-organized units called Marine 
Air Ground Task Forces (MAGTF).  The left side of Figure 1 demonstrates the command 
relationship between Combatant Commander and the Marine Corps, while the right side 
of the figure shows how the Marine Corps organizes into MAGTFs to respond to the 
corresponding threat level.  The Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) is the largest of the 
MAGTFs.  There are three MEFs in the Marine Corps.  I MEF is headquartered at Camp 
Pendleton, California; II MEF is in Camp LeJeune, North Carolina; and III MEF in 
Okinawa, Japan.  The MEF commander establishes the three smaller MAGTFs with his 
internal personnel and equipment.  Reserve augmentation is provided when necessary 
(normally major theater war).  Besides the MEF, the MEU is the only other MAGTF 
operational every day.  Normally, at least two MEUs are deployed somewhere around the 
2 
globe every day.  Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB) and Special Purpose MAGTFs 
(SPMAGTF) are stood up to respond to contingencies when required.     
  
Figure 1.  Marine Air Ground Task Force (From:  USMC Strategy 21) 
 
 
There are seven Marine Expeditionary Units in the Marine Corps:  three (11th, 
13th, and 15th MEUs) are home-based with I MEF, three (22d, 24th, and 26th MEUs) 
with II MEF, and one from III MEF (31st MEU).  Figure 2 shows the areas of 
responsibility for the MEUs deployed outside the continental United States.  The I MEF 
MEUs generally deploy to the Indian Ocean and are a force in readiness to respond to 
contingencies in East Africa, Southwest Asia, and South Asia.  II MEF responsibility is 
Europe, and West Africa.  They spend most of their deployments in the Mediterranean 
Sea.  III MEF patrols the Far East.  These units leave their home station for forward 
deployment aboard U.S. Navy ships as the landing force of an Amphibious Readiness 
Group (ARG).  They may or may not deploy to join a Carrier Battle Group.  Once 
deployed, the ARG becomes a national asset for reaction to world crises and is under the 
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administrative control of the Fleet Commander of the area in which they are transiting.  
For instance, a MEU from Camp Pendleton trains under third fleet for a deployment to 
the Arabian Gulf. After it is deployed, operational control passes to 7th Fleet followed by 
5th fleet when it goes through their respective areas of responsibility (AOR).  Operational 







Figure 2.  MEF Areas of Responsibility (From:  USMC Strategy 21) 
 
The Marine Corps advertises that the MEUs are self-supporting for 15 days and is 
capable of performing a myriad of missions on short notice from the National Command 
Authority.  Each of the MEUs takes its own mix of personnel and equipment that the 
commander believes will allow him to meet the requirements of a six-month deployment.  
The MEU commander is constrained in his selection of equipment and personnel by ship 
space and availability of assets.  Because of the importance of the MEUs mission, 
normally if the MEU commander deems he needs an asset for deployment, he will get it 
if he can fit it on the ship.  For example, only one of the three MEUs (13th) on the west 
coast has recently deployed with tanks that take up a lot of space on board the ARG's 
ships.  An example of personnel differences among the MEUs is that all II MEF MEUs 
deploy with one enlisted contract specialist (MOS 3044) while none of the I MEF or III 
MEF MEUs have 3044s assigned.  It is the responsibility of the MEU commander to 
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identify any requirement shortfalls up the chain of command upon the receipt of orders 
for a specific mission.  The Fleet commander normally sources shortfalls to other 
agencies under his command.  This is how west coast MEUs normally receive contracting 
support when they deploy or receive a mission for a contingency operation. 
The normal cycle (cycles may be shortened or lengthened based on world 
situation) for continental U.S. (CONUS) MEUs is six months of pre-deployment training, 
followed by six months deployment, and then six months of post deployment.  The 
researcher will address the III MEF cycle in Chapter II.  Figure 3 shows the command 
relationships in the MEU.  All MEUs are composed of four Marine Corps elements that 
come together along with the Navy component to train (pre-deployment) for and conduct 
the deployment.  The only element that remains a full time component of the MEU is the 
Command Element (CE).  The other three elements are the MEU Service Support Group 
(MSSG), Battalion Landing Team (BLT), and the Aviation Combat Element (ACE).  
Referring back to Figure 1, the MSSG is tasked from the Force Service Support Group, 
the BLT is tasked from the Division, and the ACE from the Wing.  These three units, 
personnel and equipment, go back to their parent commands at the conclusion of the 
deployment.  Therefore, each time a MEU works up for deployment and deploys, it does 
so with different personnel and equipment in the MSSG, BLT, and ACE.  It also has a 
different ARG.  Since these units have not worked together previously, there is a great 
deal of coordination to be worked out during the pre-deployment training period to 







Figure 3.  MEU Command Structure  (From:  Researcher Developed) 
 
 
When a MEU leaves its home base for the deployment it normally has a training 
plan with exercises it intends to conduct in countries within its AOR.  For example, 13th 
MEU left for their last deployment with exercises scheduled for United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait.  It is normally intended for all ships in the ARG, and 
therefore all components of the MEU, to remain together during the deployment.  
Occasionally however, contingencies may interrupt this training cycle and exercises may 
be canceled and new requirements placed on the entire MEU, or only a part of the ARG 
may be pulled away to perform another mission while the remainder of the MEU 
continues in the training plan.  When the ships of the ARG are separated for different 
missions, this is referred to as “split ARG operations.”   
Because of its importance in attaining requirements that the MEU could not 
deploy with, contracting support is one of the items that should be planned during pre 
deployment training.  Where support will come from for contingencies not yet known as 
addressed in the previous paragraph must be addressed.    At a minimum, there are five 
sources of contracted support for a deployed MEU:   
1. MEU enlisted contract specialists  
2. MEU Supply Officer 




3. Naval Regional Contracting Centers  
4. Husbanding services contractors in country 
5. Other external support 
 
 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE  
This thesis will compare and contrast the methods employed by the different 
MEUs in acquiring the necessary contracting support.  By researching methods of 
contracting support by each MEU this study will determine the best processes available 
to the MEU commander.  The objective will be to determine optimal contracting assets 
for a MEU while deployed while taking into consideration the characteristics of the area 
where the support will be required.  The following research questions will guide the 
researcher in the pursuit of the thesis objective. 
 
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
 
1.  Primary Research Question:   
 
What is the United States Marine Corps' experience with contract support of 
deployed Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and how might this information be 
used to enhance the support to deployed units? 
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2.  Secondary Research Questions:  
(a) What are the current USMC policies with respect to contract support and 
how does the USMC typically provide support to deployed MEUs? 
(b) What are the various types of contract support required by deployed 
MEUs? 
(c) What are the current issues associated with the support methodologies 
chosen by the Marine Corps?  
(d) Are the current methods of providing contract support adequate and 
responsive to deployed unit needs? 
(e) Are alternative contract support methods available to deployed units?  If 
so, what are the advantages and disadvantages associated with various 
contract support methodologies? 
(f) How might the USMC alter current practices to enhance the level of 
support provided to deployed MEUs? 
 
E. SCOPE OF THE THESIS  
 
The scope will include: (1) an examination of current contracting support 
procedures for the MEUs; (2) presentation of issues and concerns associated with the 
different methods of providing contracting support; and (3) analysis of what sources of 
contracting support are most appropriate for MEU deployments to include a survey of 
enlisted contract specialists to determine implications for increased responsibilities or 
billets.   
 
F. METHODOLOGY  
 
The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps: 
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Conduct a comprehensive literature search of Marine Corps Lessons Learned, 
professional magazine articles, unit standard operating procedures (SOPs), and 
command orders. 
Conduct a survey of enlisted contract specialists. 
Conduct interviews either in person, or by telephone, with MEU Supply Officers, 




G. BENEFITS OF RESEARCH  
This thesis is intended to benefit the Marine Corps in regards to planning for, and 
implementation of support to Marine Expeditionary Unit deployments.  By possessing the 
optimal deployed contracting support, the MEU will be truly self-sustaining and provide 
the MEU commander with maximum flexibility in timely accomplishment of short-fused 
missions.  This thesis will assist the MEU commander in making the decisions of what 
contracting assets to deploy with and what to request from higher headquarters as an 
internal deficiency.      
H. THESIS ORGANIZATION  
The first chapter contains a broad overview of a MEU and how it is comprised for 
deployment.  Additionally this chapter introduces the subject MEU contracting support 
along with research criteria used in the conduct of this research effort.    
Chapter II examines the missions a MEU must be prepared to perform during a 
deployment and the internal supply capabilities of each MEU.  However, the focus of the 
Chapter will be on the deployments of each of the MEUs.  It gives a broad overview of 
the deployment cycles of the MEUs with an introduction to the type of contracting 
support provided.   
Chapter III contains detailed description of each of the different types of 
contracting support available to the MEU.  
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Chapter IV provides a detailed analysis of the research conducted with an 
introduction and examination of a survey of Marine Corps enlisted contracting 
specialists. 
Chapter V presents specific conclusions derived from the research and any 
recommendations for improvement of the MEU contracting support effort.  It concludes 
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II.  BACKGROUND 
A. INTRODUCTION  
As described in the preceding chapter, each of the MEUs deploys with the assets 
it believes it needs to accomplish assigned missions.  This chapter first introduces the 
missions the MEU may be called upon to perform during its deployment and the type of 
contract support involved in those missions.  Secondly, this chapter introduces the basic 
internal supply support capabilities inherent in all MEUs.  Thirdly, this chapter describes 
typical deployment for each of the MEUs by the MEF.  The biggest difference in 
deployments between each of the MEF's MEUs  is where they are traveling and what 
they encounter in a typical deployment.  Each deployment is different, so it is hard to 
define a typical deployment.  For purposes of this thesis a typical deployment is a 
deployment in which MEU personnel depart the ship to participate in at least one major 
exercise, whether planned prior to deployment or a Combatant Commander directed 
contingency operation.  An atypical deployment would be when a MEU has its exercises 
ashore canceled and spends the majority of its time afloat awaiting orders or conducts 
exercises with personnel only and no assets go ashore. 
B. MEU CONTINGENCY OPERATION MISSIONS  
During the pre-deployment workups, the MEUs train to perform the 29 different 
real world missions that it may be tasked with during their deployment.  These missions 
are listed in Table 1, and vary in duration, size of the operation concerning how many 
personnel are involved, and logistical support required.  The receipt of one of these 
missions during a deployment will denote a contingency operation and results in the 
cancellation of other planned training the MEU has scheduled and coordinated prior to 
12 
deployment.  Many are special operations exercises (the direct action operations in Table 
1) for which the MEU must get certified to perform prior to departing for deployment.  
This certification makes the MEU a MEU(SOC), or special operations capable.     
Amphibious Operations Supporting Operations 
• Amphibious Assault • Tactical Deception Operations 
• Amphibious Raid • Limited Expeditionary Airfield Operations 
• Amphibious Demonstration • Airfield/Port Seizure 
• Amphibious Withdrawal • Military Operations in Urban Terrain 
(MOUT) 
Direct Action Operations • Reconnaissance and Surveillance (R&S) 
• In-Extremis Hostage Recovery (IHR) • Initial Terminal Guidance 
• Seizure/Recovery of Offshore Energy 
Facilities 
• Counterintelligence Operations 
• Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure (VBSS) • Airfield/Port Seizure 
• Special Demolition Operations • Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)/Electronic 
Warfare 
• Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel 
(TRAP) 
• Fire Support Planning, Control, and 
Coordination in a Joint/Combined 
Environment 
• Seizure/Recovery of Selected Personnel or 
Material 
• Show of Force Operations 
MOOTW • JTF Enabling Operations 
• Peace Operations • Sniping Operations 
• Security Operations  
• Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations 
(NEO) 
 
• Reinforcement Operations  
• Joint/Combined Training/Instruction Team  
• Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief  
Table 1.  MEU Missions (From:  Marine Corps Order 3120.9) 
 
The MEU Supply Officer (SupO) must be prepared to support all of these 
missions and coordinate with contracting personnel for the requirements generated from 
the operation.  The Direct action missions and many of the supporting operations 
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missions involve the use of few forces or no forces going ashore and little or no 
contracting support.  Most of the amphibious operations and Military Operations Other 
Than War (MOOTW) missions will involve large numbers of forces going ashore with a 
heavy contracting support requirement.  The contracting requirements will also vary with 
the mission.  An amphibious assault operation may involve the contracting of a large 
number of tractor-trailers for in land transportation, while an amphibious raid by its 
nature is a quick strike mission that should not require contracting.   
The MOOTW missions are the most contracting intensive missions because they 
usually involve large numbers of Marines staying ashore and a larger contracting effort.  
Usually this brings with it the establishment of a base camp or command post and the life 
support needs that go with a base camp.  Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief missions 
can require the most diverse requirements and are typically the hardest to get of any of 
the missions because they may not be available in the country you are supporting.  
Humanitarian assistance generally involves a heavy emphasis on acquiring food, medical, 
dental, and engineering supplies.  Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) may or may 
not already be on the ground when the MEU arrives, but if not, they will be there soon 
after and will be the lead agency in support operations.  The Noncombatant Evacuation 
Operation (NEO) is the one MOOTW operation that varies greatly from the others.  It 
involves a small number of forces and aircraft going ashore to evacuate U.S. civilian 
personnel from a hostile environment to a safe haven either aboard ship or a friendly 
country.  Speed can be of utmost importance in a NEO to ensure the safe removal of 
noncombatants from a dangerous situation.  It may require the use of aircraft external to 
the MEU who may bring their own contracting support.  Once delivered to the safe haven 
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country, the contracting support for the evacuees becomes the responsibility of the 
Combatant Commander.  Generally, the personnel evacuated include embassy personnel, 
of which there is a contracting officer.     
C. MEU INTERNAL SUPPLY SUPPORT  
Each element within the MEU has its own supply section and due to space 
constraints aboard ship deploys with limited administrative supplies, repair parts, and 
miscellaneous items to start the deployment.  When one of the elements has a 
requirement they cannot fill, depending on the type of requirement, there are three 
potential internal sources of support to fill the requirement:  the MSSG supply section, 
the ACE’s aviation supply section, and the MEU supply/logistics section. 
Figure 4 shows the supply requisition flow for the MEU.  The MSSG supply 
section is responsible for providing resupply of items available through the Marine Corps 
supply system.  These are typically equipment repair parts, lubricants, and containerized 
field rations (Meals Ready to Eat (MRE), or Tray rations).  Each of the MEU elements is 
authorized to order directly from MSSG supply.  Requisitions to MSSG Supply are either 
provided directly from the block of supplies the MSSG deployed with, or passed back to 
the Supported Activities Supply System (SASSY) Management Unit (SMU) supporting 
them from their home base.  These requisitions are prioritized and can take long lead 
times to be received.  For most of these items, there is no alternative item available for 
purchase on the open market overseas.  For instance, you wouldn’t be able to find an M1-





Figure 4.  Internal supply support flow chart (From:  Researcher developed) 
 
The ACE’s aviation supply section has responsibility for filling all requisitions for 
aviation parts.  This is done through the ship’s aviation supply department, which the 
ACE has authority to deal directly with the ship for all these requirements.  These 
requisitions are outside the scope of this research. 
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The MEU supply/logistics section maintains the fiscal records for the MEU and is 
the only element authorized to approve requisitions outside the Marine Corps supply 
system.  Any requirement that is either not available through the Marine Corps supply 
system or cannot be received in a timely manner through the system, and an alternative 
might be available through a local vendor, is passed to the MEU supply section.  The 
MEU SupO validates the requirement and if it can be purchased from stocks of supplies 
on the ship, he may decide to purchase it through the ship’s Supply department.  The ship 
stocks many items for the deployment also, and some requirements may be available 
through them.  If coordinated in advance, some ship’s supply officers will stock items for 
a MEU deployment.  This can save critical storage space for the MEU, however the 
SupO may require that you purchase what he stocks in advance to guarantee that he 
doesn’t get stuck with it.  Finally, for those items that must be purchased from a local 
vendor, the MEU SupO will pass it to his contracting representative, either internal or 
external to the MEU.  Chapter III will address the different contracting alternatives open 
to the MEU.     
The one purchasing option internal to all MEUs is the Government Purchase 
Card.  Depending on the arrangements made with the contracting office prior to 
deployment, the purchasing authority on these cards is either $2,500 or $25,000.  The 
dollar value has varied depending upon the base from which base they have deployed.  
This option will be discussed further in Chapter III. 
The MEU has the internal capability to pay their invoices through their 
Disbursing Officer (DisbO).  The DisbO’s main mission is to provide cash to the Marines 
aboard ship for purchase of personal items and enjoyment during port calls, however the 
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MEU SupO needs to establish a good working relationship early with the DisbO.  The 
SupO must ensure that the DisbO deploys with enough cash and understands that he must 
make himself available for the rear party to closeout all invoices.  The DisbO has 
unlimited check writing authority to pay an authorized invoice, however in many 
countries vendors will accept cash only because of the unstable banking or monetary 
system.  The MEU SupO, or his contracting representative, needs to identify the payment 
situation during pre deployment planning conferences.  
D. I MEF MEU DEPLOYMENTS  
I MEF MEUs do not deploy with a contingency contracting officer, additionally, 
the MEU Supply Officer does not possess a warrant, and their Government purchase card 
limit is $2,500.  The six-month pre-deployment training period is crucial to establish the 
contracting support working relationships for the deployment.  During this time the MEU 
builds up its block of supplies with which it will deploy, conducts planning conferences 
overseas in the area it will be deploying, and coordinates with the supporting Supply 
Battalion at Camp Pendleton.   
When the I MEF MEU builds its initial block of supplies that are not available 
through the supply system for the deployment, they depend on the contracting personnel 
at the base contracting office.  The MEU follows the same administrative procedures as 
any other unit aboard Camp Pendleton; the contracting office does not dedicate a 
representative to fill the requirements of the MEU.  The advantage the MEU has over any 
other unit aboard the base is the priority of the requests is normally higher.  The MEU is 
on an accelerated training cycle prior to deployment and generally all requisitions for 
open purchase are highest priority and the required delivery date is normally short fused.  
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Three months prior to deployment the MEU is authorized to increase its highest priority 
requisitions to 02, a priority given to only a few other units with high priority missions on 
base.  The base contracting office is normally responsive with no significant complaints 
from recent MEU SupOs.  
I MEF MEUs make the longest trip of any of the MEUs.  Departing from 
California, they travel across the globe to the Arabian Gulf or East Africa. There are four 
different kinds of stops a MEU can make in foreign countries during its deployment: 
“sustainment training”, exercise training, port calls, and contingency missions.   
The I MEF MEUs transit is so long that they typically do “sustainment training” 
in Hawaii, Singapore and/or Australia so that the skills they developed in the workups are 
sustained.  Total cost for this sustainment training is low for all three locations with no 
individual contract requirement exceeding $25,000.  In Hawaii, the base contracting 
office at Marine Corps Base Kaneohe Bay in Hawaii supports the few contracting 
requirements (e.g. portable toilets, cell phones, pagers, transportation,) much the same 
way as though they were at Camp Pendleton.  The MEU SupO can coordinate this 
support in advance via phone, E-Mail, Fax, and an advanced party arriving a week prior.  
The Singapore Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC) supports training in 
Singapore.  The MEU SupOs interviewed felt the NRCC was very responsive to the 
needs of the MEU.  The contracting effort is almost exclusively transportation of Marines 
from the ship to the training sites on the island and cell phones and pagers.  Any other 
requirements might involve limited items the MEU forgot to deploy with, computer parts, 
or copier/office equipment repair the ship personnel can’t perform.  The MEU SupO can 
coordinate this support in advance via phone, E-Mail, Fax, and an advanced party 
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arriving a couple days prior.  If the MEU does sustainment training in Australia, the 
NRCC Singapore office coordinates the use of the existing husbanding contract.  MEUs 
have coordinated this support with E-Mail, fax, phone and advance party.  One MEU 
conducted a Final Planning Conference with NRCC Singapore, and host nation support 
personnel prior to deployment. 
Each I MEF MEU normally deploys with a training schedule consisting of three 
exercises, normally in the Arabian Gulf area or east Africa.  The list of countries in which 
exercises have been conducted over the past three years includes:  Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, 
Bahrain, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, Kenya and Djibouti.  One of these 
exercises is normally a major exercise involving the entire MEU.  It will consist of either 
an amphibious offload aboard Navy landing craft or an administrative offload pier-side.  
Once offloaded, inland transportation (tractor-trailers, busses) are required to transport 
assets and personnel to the training area usually at least 20 miles in land.  At the training 
area a base camp is set up for a command base and support base for the training.  This 
support base may require contracting for engineering and life support needs such as 
lumber, nails, fresh fruits and vegetables, bottled water, ice, refrigerated trailers, portable 
toilets, etc.  Once the exercise is concluded, transportation is required to return the 
vehicles and personnel to the ship.  The two smaller exercises the MEU will participate in 
will normally involve smaller size units going ashore with little contracting required.  
Normally contracting support for these exercises will be coordinated during planning 
conferences prior to deployment.  These conferences will involve trips to each of the 
countries in which training will be conducted plus Bahrain, headquarters of Navy Central 
Command (NAVCENT) and Marine Corps Central Command (MARCENT).  The 
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NRCC Naples detachment in Bahrain is responsible for coordinating this contracting 
support.  Depending on the country in which the exercise will be conducted, NRCC 
Bahrain has supported these exercises in the past with a warranted contracting officer 
possessing an unlimited warrant, Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) established with 
multiple vendors for use by the MEU SupO, contracting from Bahrain, and establishing 
relationships between the MEU SupO and the husbanding agent for the country.  The 
only occurrence of an individual contracting requirement exceeding $100,000 was in 
Jordan in 1997 and 1999 for aviation fuel.  Each of the MEU SupOs felt satisfied that, 
even though some difficulties were encountered at times, prior planning was sufficient to 
provide all contracting needs of these exercises during deployment.              
Port calls are normally administrative in nature and allow the Marines and Sailors 
to get a little liberty.  Many times they are at smaller ports to give a boost to the local 
economy.  Contracting needs for vehicles and cell phones/pagers are normally 
coordinated through the ships SupO in his Logistics Requirements (LogReq) message 
and received from the husbanding agent when the ship pulls into port.   
Whereas the other stops during the deployment have been preplanned and the 
contracting effort preplanned with the supporting organization, contingency operations, 
as discussed earlier in this thesis, or additional port calls may be directed by the 
Combatant Commander on short notice.  Additional port calls are no problem to 
coordinate on short notice, as they are simple efforts usually arranged through the ship 
SupO.  Contingency operations may be quite difficult.  The ARG commander must 
request contracting support upon receipt of the mission.  Usually this support comes from 
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the NRCC in the AOR.  Table 2 lists the contingencies I MEF MEUs have participated in 
since 1997.    








Kuwait Feb-May 1998 11th Show of Force 
Safe 
Departure 
Eritrea June 1998 11th NEO 
Desert 
Thunder II 
Kuwait Nov 1998 15th Show of Force 
Resolute 
Response 




Cancelled Eritrea/Somalia March-Apr 1999 13th NEO  
International 
Force 








Yemen Nov 2000 13th Security 
Operations 
Table 2.  I MEF MEU Contingency Operations (From:  Researcher developed) 
As discussed earlier, these contingency operations can range from requiring a 
large presence of the MEU with the majority of the MEU going ashore requiring a major 
contracting effort, as in Operation Desert Thunder in Kuwait, to small detachments 
requiring little or no contracting support (the remainder of the exercises in the table 
would fall in this category).   The canceled NEO in Eritrea is an example of a MEU 
receiving a warning order for a mission and never conducting the mission even though 
contracting support was provided.  NRCC Det Bahrain has supported these exercises by 
providing a contracting officer in country.  In Kuwait, contracting was handed off to the 
ARCENT contracting office in Camp Doha.  The MEU SupOs interviewed were all 
pleased with the contracting support they received on these exercises except in Kuwait 
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where he complained of the frustrations of dealing with the bureaucracy.  The SupOs 
preferred having a single point of contact to go to for their needs.    
E. II MEF MEU DEPLOYMENTS  
II MEF MEUs deployments are similar to those of I MEF except for the length of 
transit.  There is generally not a need for the MEU to conduct sustainment training prior 
to arrival in their AOR.  Like their counterparts from the west coast, they deploy with a 
training plan with exercises and port calls for which they have attended pre-deployment 
planning conferences and face the uncertainty of having this training plan disrupted by 
contingency operations in their AOR.  Contracting requirements are typically the same as 
a west coast MEU depending on the type of operation or training exercise   
The II MEF MEUs conduct the majority of their training in the Mediterranean Sea 
even though their AOR also includes Western Africa.  Over the past three years training 
has been conducted in Albania, Croatia, Egypt, Greece, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kosovo, 
Tunisia, Morocco, Spain, and Turkey.  Table 3 lists the contingency operations that II 
MEF MEUs have participated in since 1997.  The table shows that some of these 
Operations go on for years and may develop into new missions/operations, as is the case 
in the former Yugoslavia.  Flare-ups and/or relief forces in place may involve the use of 
MEUs being called into these regions on a continuing basis.  This is also the case with I 









Adriatic Sea 1997 22nd, 24th, 
26th 
Show of Force 
Joint Guard Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
1997 22nd, 24th, 
26th 
Peace Keeping 
Silver Wake Albania Mar-Jul 97 26th NEO 
Noble Obelisk Sierra Leone June 97 22nd NEO 
Desert 
Thunder I 
Kuwait June 98 24th Show of Force 
Joint Forge Bosnia-
Herzegovina 







Albania Aug-Dec 98 22nd, 24th Security 
Operations 
Shining Hope Albania Apr.-Jul 99 24th, 26th Security Ops, 
HAO 
Noble Anvil Kosovo Feb-Jul 99 24th,  26th Show of Force 
Table 3.  II MEF MEU Contingency Operations (From:  Researcher developed)) 
 
A major difference between I MEF and II MEF deployments is the likelihood of 
split ARG operations in which the ships of the MEU separate to perform different 
missions.  This is common with II MEF MEUs, while very infrequent with I MEF MEUs.  
Each of the SupOs interviewed from the east coast had experienced split ARG ops or will 
in his next deployment, while only two from the west coast experienced split ARG ops.  
In the case of the I MEF MEUs, external contracting was required by only one half of the 
MEU when split in both instances.  Each of the II MEF MEU SupOs stated that external 
contracting support was required at least once by each half of the MEU while split.  One 
SupO addressed the need to do planning/advance party for follow on operations while 





Sometimes I wish we had another contracting specialist with us, but we 
make do...Another problem is concurrent planning of exercises while 
another exercise is in progress.  Often, the 3044 or ordering officer needs 
to be part of an advance party or planning conference to begin making 
contracting arrangements for an upcoming exercise, but there are other 
exercises on-going.  We solved this problem by having three ordering 
officers besides the 3044.   (Ref. 1) 
 
 
F. III MEF MEU DEPLOYMENTS  
III MEF MEU (31st MEU) deployments are quite different from those of I and II 
MEF.  Because of the forward presence of the base from which they deploy, Okinawa, 
Japan, the 31st MEU is already in its area of responsibility (AOR).  Even though in the 
past couple of years they have deployed to the Arabian Gulf, their AOR consists of the 
Far East.  They routinely conduct training in Australia, Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Guam.  Because the Battalion Landing Team (BLT) comes from Camp Pendleton, 
California, the pre-deployment training cycle in Okinawa is also condensed.  The total 
length of the deployment for the BLT is six months long.  Therefore to get their entire 
workup training completed, they start it Camp Pendleton and complete it on Okinawa 
with the remainder of the MEU.   Deployments are usually three months or shorter and 
involve one major exercise.   
Table 4 shows the contingency operations performed by 31st MEU since 1997.  
As stated earlier, even though the Middle East is not their AOR, they responded to 
contingency operations in that area in late 1998, early 1999.  The reason for this was to 
ease the deployment schedule of the I MEF MEUs so that a MEU may be in the area 
during the period when Iraq was threatening noncompliance with U.N. resolutions for 
arms inspection.  (Ref. 2:p. 23)  In the past, 31st MEUs have deployed with a 3044, but 
the most recent MEU SupOs have been granted limited contracting warrants.  They have 
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also received contracting support from other component commands as a component of 
joint exercises.       
Name  Location Date Type of Contingency 
Desert Thunder II Kuwait Nov 98 Show of Force 
Desert Fox Kuwait Dec 98 Security Operations 
Maritime Interdiction 
Operations 
Arabian Gulf Jan-Feb 99 VBSS 
International Force East Timor Oct 1999- Dec 
2000 
Peace Keeping 
Table 4.  III MEF MEU Contingency Operations (From:  Researcher developed) 
 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
Although each of the MEFs has its own way of supporting its MEUs while 
deployed, all seven MEUs have the same organization, the same general deployment 
structure, are expected to perform the same missions, and generate the same 
requirements.  The differences of these deployments are in the length of transit and the 
countries in which they operate, this gives the II MEF MEUs more time spent in their 
AOR and a more extensive training plan.  This may or may not be a justification to why 
they deploy with a 3044.  The next chapter will discuss each of the methods of MEU 
contracting support in detail and will illuminate what is available to each of the MEUs 
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III.  SOURCES OF CONTRACTING SUPPORT 
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter discusses the different alternatives to support the MEUs.  As 
addressed in the previous chapter, each MEU uses these alternatives in different ways.  
This discussion will focus on what support each can provide and how these sources are 
used by the MEU.  It is the MEU Supply Officer’s responsibility to arrange the 
contracting support for any MEU requirements that are not available through the Marine 
Corps supply system.  During the course of a deployment, a MEU SupO may use any 
combination of these methods to support the MEU.   
B. MEU SUPLY OFFICER/SUPLY PERSONNEL  
The MEU SupO and the logistics officer (S-4), have to decide what tools they 
want to use during the deployment to support their command with the necessary 
contracting abilities.  These tools may include arranging contracting authority of some 
sort for the MEU SupO and/or other supply personnel like the supply chief or fiscal chief.  
Contracting authority open to the MEU SupO includes:  the Government-wide 
Commercial Purchase Card (GCPC), ordering official authority against established 
contracts, and a contracting warrant. 
The MEU SupO by billet is the approving official for all GCPC card-holders 
under his charge and receives a one day training class from the base Regional Contracting 
Office (RCO).  These purchases are considered micro-purchases with a dollar limit of 
$2,500.  Competition requirements for these purchases are:  
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Micro-purchases may be awarded without soliciting competitive 
quotations if the contracting officer determines that the price is reasonable. 
Although competition is not required, these purchases must be equitably 
distributed among qualified suppliers. Whenever feasible, a quotation 
should be solicited from a source other than a previous supplier before 
placing a repeat order, if possible. (Ref. 3: Ch 3, para. 4a) 
 
The MEU SupO can attend the four-day NAVSUP simplified acquisitions course 
to receive an increased GCPC authority of $25,000.  The focus of the training and target 
audience are: 
Focus:   To teach the simplified acquisition methods to individuals who 
will be purchasing supplies or services for the Government on a part time 
basis, and use of the purchase card above the micro-purchase threshold 
under Letters of Agreement, GSA contract and Indefinite Delivery Type 
Contracts (ITDC), and for purchases made OCONUS for commercial 
items up to $25,000. Procurement laws, regulations, and procedures are 
covered extensively.   
Target Audience:   Individuals who will purchase supply or services for 
the Government on a part time basis, and cardholders who will have the 
authority to place orders against LOAs, IDTCs, GSA Contracts, and to 
purchase commercial items overseas up to $25,000, and Approving 
Officials over them. (Ref. 4)    
The following are the DFARS requirements for overseas GCPC purchases up to 
$25,000. 
Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 213.301 
authorizes the use of the Purchase Card, on a stand-alone basis, for purchases up 
to $25,000, if the acquisition meets the following six specific requirements: 
1. Is made outside the U.S. for use outside the U.S. 
2. Is a commercial item. 
3. Is not for use by employees recruited within the U.S. 
4. Is not for supplies or services identified in the Federal Acquisition  
Regulation (FAR) Subpart 25.7. 
5. Is not ball/roller bearings as end items. 




 As an ordering official, a MEU SupO can make delivery orders against existing 
contracts up to the amount specified in their appointment.  MCO 4200.15G states the 
requirements for appointing ordering officers: 
Prior to appointment of ordering officers, the individual shall, as a 
minimum have completed the Purchasing Fundamentals Course (Pur 101). 
Only those duly appointed ordering officers are authorized to place orders 
against existing contracts subject to the limitations prescribed by the 
appointing official. (Ref. 6: para. 2102.2a-b)   
 
 
The 4 day NAVSUP course mentioned above has met the training requirements 
for the east coast SupOs to deploy with ordering officer authority.  The most recent 
deployed with a ordering limit of $25,000 per purchase.  Appendix B is an example of an 
appointing order and acceptance. 
The last method of internal contracting support is for the MEU SupO to deploy 
with a contracting warrant.  Although MCO P4200.15G states that the MEU Supply 
Officers may be appointed as a contracting officer, this capability has only recently been 
used.  The last 31st MEU SupO deployed with a contracting warrant and the current SupO 
will deploy with a warrant with limitations that it could not be used in any situations 
where other Government contracting officers were available.  (Dalton)  MCO P4200.15G 
addresses the steps that a unit needs to take to be able to procure goods and services in 
foreign countries in excess of $2,500: 
a. The commanding officer will obtain authority from the CMC (LBO) to 
establish a purchasing office within the unit. 
 
b. The commanding officer will nominate an individual by 
name (normally the supply officer) to the CMC (LBO) as 




Table 5 shows the capabilities that each of the MEUs commonly deploys with.  
The east coast SupOs have taken advantage of the NAVSUP course addressed above to 
become ordering officers (one SupO arranged training for additional supply personnel). 
(Ref. 1)  None of the east coast SupOs have deployed with the with $25,000 GCPC card 
authority, but their 3044 routinely has a $100,000 limit.  The last two 31st MEU SupOs 
have been granted both contracting authority and the $25,000 GCPC limit. (Ref. 7)  West 
Coast MEU SupOs have received no purchasing training prior to deployments, thus 
deploys with a $2,500 GCPC limit and no ordering officer authority.  
MEU $25,000 GCPC Ordering Officer Contracting Authority 
East Coast  No Yes No 
West Coast No No No 
31st MEU Yes Yes Yes 
Table 5.  MEU Capabilities by MEF 
 
C. ENLISTED CONTRACT SPECIALIST  
Appendix A lists Enlisted Contract Specialists, Military Occupational Specialty 
(MOS) 3044, billets designated in the Marine Corps.  Of the 94 total active duty billets in 
the Marine Corps, there are 21 billets designated as contingency contracting, the 
remainder of the billets are generally base support contracting billets.  They reside within 
the Supply Company of the Supply Battalion within the Force Service Support Group 
(FSSG) of each MEF.  The FSSG Contingency Contracting Officer, a Marine Corps 
commissioned officer MOS 9656, is responsible for training and assignments of the 





Purchasing and contracting specialists perform various duties incident to 
the acquisition of supplies and non-personal services purchased via open 
market from commercial and government sources.  Marines in this MOS 
must have the ability to work independently and be objective in applying 
purchasing and contracting laws and regulations in daily activities. (Ref. 8: 
para 3121.3a) 
 
3044s are enlisted Marines who have moved in to the MOS normally from the 
administrative supply clerk MOS of 3043.  The prerequisites for application to the MOS 
are as follows:   
1.  Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) Clerical (CL) 
score of 110 or higher. 
2.  Must be interviewed and recommended by the Regional Contracting 
Officer. 
3.  Must be at least a sergeant with less than 2 years time in grade 
(waiverable to corporal) on second or subsequent enlistment with primary 
MOS 3043 (Primary MOS 3043 may be waived, on a case-by-case basis, 
when recommended by Regional Contracting Officer) 
4.  No convictions by court-martial, civilian courts, or nonjudicial 
punishment of any act involving larceny, fraud, or theft. 
5.  Must have excellent communicative skills, both verbally and in writing. 
6.  Have at minimum of 36 months of obligated service upon assignment 
of intended MOS. 
7.  Be able to type 45 words per minute, and have a general aptitude for 
computers. 
8.  Lateral move requests shall be approved through Occupational Field 
(OccFld) sponsor (Code LBO).  (Ref. 8: para 3121.3b) 
 
Once approved for the MOS, the 3044 is placed in a probationary period: 
 
1.  Marines who lateral move into this MOS from outside OccFld 30  
will be assigned MOS 3000 with an intended MOS of 3044.  All Marines 
will be assigned to a Regional Contracting Office for a period of 6 months 
for OJT.  At the completion of OJT and upon the recommendation of the 







2. If after the Marine is assigned the 3044 MOS and is found  
unacceptable within the first 24 months of being assigned to a Regional  
Contracting Office, the Regional Contracting Officer can submit a request  
to CMC MMSA/LBO requesting to administratively drop the Marine from 
MOS 3044. back to their original MOS or another.  (Ref. 8: para 
3121.3b.9-10)  
 
 The Department of the Navy (DoN) Director, Acquisition Career 
Management (DACM) office allows enlisted personnel to serve in the purchasing 
career field. (Ref 9)  The training and education certification requirements for 
3044s are: 
1.  Sergeants (E-5) must complete Level I contracting course requirements 
of the Defense Acquisition Career Development Program  (CON 101) to 
be eligible for certification in the contracting career field.  Prerequisites 
for this program require either a baccalaureate degree or at least 24 
semester hours of undergraduate work (DANTES or CLEP equivalency 
exams may be included) among accounting, law, business finance, 
contracts, purchasing, economics, industrial management, marketing, 
quantitative methods, organization and management in addition to one 
year of experience in contracting to be eligible for Level I certification in 
the contracting career field. 
2.  Staff sergeants (E-6) through master gunnery sergeants (E-9) must have 
completed Level I certification requirements and the Level II contracting 
course requirements of the Defense Acquisition Career Development 
Program (CON 202) in addition to a total of two years of contracting 
experience to be eligible for Level II certification in the contracting career 
field. (Ref. 8: para 3121.3b.11-12) 
 
 3044 Marines who are selected to deploy with a MEU have completed the 
requisite first tour, two-year probation period and are in at least their second tour.  The 
FSSG contingency contracting officer is responsible for providing the warrant to the 3044 
chosen to deploy with the MEU.  The 3044s who deployed in support of the SupOs 
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interviewed were granted warrants up to the simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000, 
with delivery order authority up to the limit of the contract.  They have routinely joined 
the MEU at the beginning of the pre-deployment training period and stayed with them 
through the six-month post-deployment training period.  This amount of the warrant 
increases to $250,000 in a declared contingency.   
The reason the Marine Corps has enlisted contracting personnel in contingency 
contracting billets is to meet contracting requirements for units when they deploy outside 
the continental United States (CONUS) for contingency operations.  (Ref 10)  In order to 
be prepared to do this, they need the experience of contracting in a foreign environment.  
The MEUs are the Marine Corps only CONUS units that deploy on a regular basis.  The 
units of III MEF train in foreign countries away from their home station on a regular 
basis.  Other than this, opportunities for 3044s to get experience contracting a foreign 
country are hard to come by.  Major Begin, the First FSSG Contingency Contracting 
Officer addressed the difficulty of getting his Marines deployed overseas in support of 
exercises when asked if he believed his 3044s get enough deployed contracting 
experience he stated " Only recently, and only because we have been working every 
angle to get Marines deployed." (Ref 11)  There are opportunities for deployment in 
support of major combined exercises overseas, however the Marine Corps has not been 
aggressive in pursuing these billets.  The Marine Corps does currently have a 
commitment of supporting the coalition forces in the Balkans with three enlisted contract 
specialists. (Ref 13)  Major Begin believed that the Air Force enlisted contracting 
specialists are so good at their craft because they do it all the time and that the reason 
3044s don’t get as many opportunities is because of the apathy of major commands 
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toward contract planning.  There are no staff contracting billets at Marine Forces Pacific 
(MARFORPAC) and Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) commands and the I and 
II MEF contracting officers have historically been given non-contracting duties.  The 
current I MEF contracting officer is working in the G-2 (intelligence), and the II MEF 
contracting officer is working in G-3 (Training and Operations).  (Ref. 12) 
   The 3044 who deploys with the II MEF MEUs deploy as a member of the 
MSSG by Table of Organization (T/O), however, he works for the MEU SupO in the 
command element logistics section.  The MEU SupO writes his fitness report.  He 
deploys with a $100,000 warrant and can write delivery orders against existing contracts 
up to the limit of the contract.  In the rare occurrence of requirements greater than 
$100,000, he can request assistance from NRCC Naples, Italy or their home station at 
Camp LeJeune, North Carolina for assistance.  Of the three MEU SupOs interviewed, 
covering five deployments, there was one instance in which the MEU had contracting 
requirements in excess of $100,000 that was not covered by the Mediterranean Logistics 
Support (MLS) contract.  In 1999, 26th MEU, received the assistance of the contingency 
contracting office in Camp LeJeune to assist in contracting for aviation landing 
rights/ramp fees in Croatia.  (Ref 14)   Each of the MEU SupOs addressed the ability of 
the MLS contract to meet almost all their requirements.  This contract vehicle will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter    
Enlisted contract specialists who meet the Defense Acquisition Workforce 
Improvement Act (DAWIA) training requirements may receive warrants with limits 
above the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT).  Also, those who do not meet the 
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requirements can receive a waiver and granted authority above the SAT.  Out of the five 
east coast deployments covered in this thesis, all 3044s had limits below the SAT. 
D. NAVAL REGIONAL CONTRACTING CENTERS  
There are two major Naval Regional Contracting Centers (NRCC) in the world, 
located in Naples, Italy and Singapore.  The mission of these NRCCs is to provide fleet 
and base support for US Navy, Military Sealift and Coast Guard ships; US bases and 
facilities; contingency operations; and continental US activities requiring supplies and 
services from countries in their AOR.  Each of these offices has branch offices to help 
them perform their mission.  The Naples, Italy office has detachments in London and 
Bahrain while Singapore has detachments in Hong Kong, Indonesia, and the Philippines.  
This thesis will examine the support of the Naples, Bahrain, and Singapore offices as they 
have provided support to the MEUs in their AORs.       
1.  NRCC NAPLES, ITALY 
The Naples Italy NRCC supports the east coast MEUs in the Mediterranean Sea 
and east Africa.  They attend pre-deployment exercise planning conferences and give a 
brief of their capabilities to the MEU staff prior to deployment.  Since the MEUs deploy 
with an enlisted contracting specialist, their interface with the MEU during deployment is 
mostly advisory in nature.  They are available to assist the 3044 with requirements that 
exceed their contracting authority, i.e. purchases greater than $100,000.   
The greatest assistance that the NRCC Naples office has provided to the MEUs is 
the comprehensive listing of husbanding contracts it has established.  The Mediterranean 
Logistics Services (MLS) husbanding contract, of which the contractors are listed in 
Appendix C, covers 20 countries with ports in the Mediterranean Sea.  The MLS is a 
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requirement contract that specifically requires Navy and Marine Corps to acquire 
required contract items from this contract.  The following is directly from the contract, to 
include the bold type: 
This contract is an indefinite delivery indefinite quantity contract for Units 
of the U.S. Army, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Department of Defense, and 
NATO.   
 
Except as provided below, this requirements contract will obligate the 
United States Navy and the U. S. Marine Corps to acquire the following 
supplies and services from the contractor at the prices established within 
the contract except when the port tariff is lower:  
 
Husbanding Services for U.S. Navy Ships (USS), Naval Fleet Auxiliary 
Force (NFAF) ships of the Military Sealift Command, and U.S. Coast 
Guard Ships (USCG) throughout the Mediterranean Sea and including The 
Gulf of Aqaba for Israeli and Jordanian ports, the Sea of Marmara, Azores 
Islands, Canary Islands, Madeira, and Portugal;  
 
• All supplies and services offered associated with the port visit set out 
in the Section entitled "Supplies\Services and Prices"  including the 
Unique Port Services described herein; 
 
• Services in support of Operations Other than War as described herein 
throughout the Mediterranean Sea and including the Sea of Marmara, 
Azores Islands, Canary Islands, Madeira, and Portugal. 
 
Exceptions:  
(a) any supplies or services which the U.S. Government may furnish 
within its own capabilities, or via host nation support. 
(b)  ships operating outside the Command and Control of the 6th Fleet, 2nd 
Fleet, or other U.S. Navy Fleets. 
(c)  whenever there are existing U.S. Government or foreign government 
capabilities in the port, the government will have the choice whether to 
order supplies or services from U. S. or foreign government facilities, or 
from the contractor.  
(d) whenever ship repair work is being done in conjunction with the Port 
Visit. 
(e) whenever a fixed price product or service listed in this contract is 
available at a lower price under a port tariff.  (Ref 15.: p. 3) 
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The requirements contract does have a minimum order amuont of $2,500 for 
required purchases:  "When the Government requires supplies or services covered by this 
contract in an amount of less than $2500.00 per instance, the Government is not obligated 
to purchase, nor is the Contractor obligated to furnish, those supplies or services under 
the contract."  (Ref 15.: Section IV.B.12.a, p. 9)  
Listed in Appendix D are husbanding services contractors in all countries along 
the west coast of Africa with which NRCC Naples has contracts.  Except for Kosovo, the 
MEUs have not performed an exercise in a country that is not covered by one of these 
contracts.    
2.  NRCC BAHRAIN 
NRCC Bahrain detachment has taken a more hands on approach to supporting the 
west coast MEUs.  They have supported the MEUs through three methods:  1. Providing 
a contracting officer in direct support, 2. Setting up Blanket Purchase Agreements (BPA) 
with local vendors for the SupO to place orders against, 3. Providing Husbanding Agents.   
When the NRCC provides a contracting officer, he is a civilian Government 
contracting officer with an unlimited warrant.  He attends all planning conferences in the 
exercise country and coordinates with the MEU SupO and U.S. personnel in country for 
support during the exercise.  In support of the exercise, he deploys to meet the MEUs 
advanced party and stays through the rear party to close out all contracts.  He works 
alongside the MEU SupO to provide all external contracting support. 
NRCC Bahrain has established BPAs in Kuwait with the MEU SupOs designated 
as ordering officers.  Training was provided to the MEU SupO during planning 
conference trips to Bahrain.  These BPAs were established with logistics companies and 
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written with a broad scope to include anything the SupO required, much as a husbanding 
contractor.  The ordering limit has been $25,000 per order.  These BPAs were established 
in Kuwait in late 1998 at the request of the Army Central Command Kuwait (ARCENT-
KU) contracting office.  (Ref. 16)  
The third option the NRCC has used in support of MEUs is through husbanding 
contractors.  Appendix E lists the husbanding contractors from their office.  As late as 
early 1999 there was no husbanding contractor in Kuwait.  Even though he did not 
receive the requisite training as discussed earlier to become an ordering officer, one MEU 
SupO was supported through a husbanding services contractor in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE). 
3.  NRCC SINGAPORE 
NRCC Singapore has directly supported the west coast MEUs sustainment 
training in Singapore as discussed in Chapter 2.  Also, even though they have not 
received the required ordering officer training, the MEUs have also used their husbanding 
contracts in Australia.  13th MEU used the Darwin contract to support operations in both 
Australia and to fly in support to East Timor.  Appendix F lists the husbanding services 
contracts in place from the NRCC Singapore office.  The following gives guidance on 
receiving contracting support in ports not provided with husbanding services contracts: 
Not all ports visited by Navy ships operating in the Western Pacific 
Region are covered in this instruction.  Many small ports are visited so 
infrequently that establishing contractual coverage for supplies and 
services is impractical.   Additions or revisions to this guide will be 
published as additional contracts are awarded or port service information 
is gathered.   For Supplies/Services required but not listed in this guide, 
please send an unclassified message describing your requirements in plain 
language to the appropriate activity from the list shown below, 
information copy to NAVREGCONTCEN SINGAPORE.    
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Include the required delivery date(s) and location(s). Where applicable, 
include accounting data.  
 
Singapore NAVREGCONTCEN SINGAPORE  
Malaysia USDAO KUALA LUMPUR 
Philippines USDAO MANILA RP 






COMSEVENTHFLT REP WESTERN AS 
Thailand USDAO BANGKOK TH 
Fiji USDAO SUVA 
Hong Kong SHIPSUPPOFF HONG KONG HK 
Manila NRCC SINGAPORE DET MANILA 
These activities will either coordinate your requirements with a 
husbanding agent or place the order for your requirements directly.  In 
either case, you will receive a message update on the status of your 
requirements.   
 (Ref. 17:  para. 102) 
 
E. HUSBANDING SERVICES CONTRACTORS/AGENTS  
There seems to be confusion over the use of the terms husbanding services 
contractor and husbanding agent, but there is a very important legal distinction between 
the two terms.  A contractor is defined simply as a person or entity that enters into a 
contract, or a person who performs services but is not an employee, often called an 
"independent contractor." (Ref. 18)  The term agent provides the subject person or entity 
much greater power in acting on behalf of the other entity in the relationship as described 
here: 
agent: n. a person who is authorized to act for another (the agent's 
principal) through employment, by contract or apparent authority. The 
importance is that the agent can bind the principal by contract or create 
liability if he/she causes injury while in the scope of the agency. Who is an 
agent and what is his/her authority are often difficult and crucial factual 
issues.(Ref. 18)  
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None of the husbanding contracts written by the three NRCCs establishes an 
agency relationship between the contractor and the Government.  The MLS contract 
states that it is an indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity (IDIQ) requirements contract, 
and all Singapore husbanding contracts specify the relation of the contractor to the 
Government: 
(a) DEFINITION OF GOVERNMENT-CONTRACTOR 
RELATIONSHIP.  The awardee of this contract is an independent 
contractor of the U.S. Navy.  No agency relationship exists between the 
awardee and the U.S. Navy.  The Contractor shall not state or imply that it 
is an agent of the U.S. Navy in communications with other parties. (Ref. 
19: Section III (a)) 
 
  These contracts are written to support Navy ships requirements when they arrive 
in port in the country for which the contract is written.  Many of these items are Navy 
specific such as lighterage, fenders, cranes, etc, however, they are useful to Marine Corps 
units because they routinely include such items as rental vehicles, cell phones, and fresh 
fruits and vegetables.  Also the contract calls for the contractor to provide other supplies 
and services the Government may require.  The contractor receives a fee to provide this 
service and He cannot add an additional charge to the invoices for these items.  Although 
the NRCC Singapore refers to a husbanding agent, they are referring to a husbanding 
services contractor by describing these purchases. 
 
The husbanding agent should be asked to arrange for the purchase of 
required supplies/services.  The husbanding contract contains provisions 
requiring the husbanding agent to obtain supplies/services at reasonable 
prices, using competition, where possible. The husbanding agent is also 
required to submit copies of dealer invoices to the ship for reimbursement 
at cost.  Remember, however, the husbanding agent is not a contracting 
officer.  It is the ship's Supply Officer, in the role of contracting 
officer, who must determine that the price to be paid is fair and 
reasonable.(Ref. 17: para. 304) 
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The MEU SupO can order these items through the Ship's SupO or, if authorized 
by the NRCC, or the contract itself, as the MLS contract does, he can order directly 
through the husbanding contractor.  Prior to arrival at a port, the ship's SupO will send a 
Logistics Request (LOGREQ) message to the NRCC or U.S. Defense Attache Office 
(USDAO) of its contract requirements.  For ease of handling, the MEU can provide 
funding to the ship and combine their requests with the ship's.  This is routine for 
administrative port calls.  Exercise support is normally done by separate liaison.      
F. OTHER CONTRACTING SUPPORT ALTERNATIVES  
1.  Joint Environment 
Contracting for joint exercises and contingency operations in other countries may 
be controlled by another service.  MCO P4200.15C states this relationship: 
The responsibility for the purchase of locally available 
supplies and the leasing of real property in foreign countries is 
assumed by the senior Armed Forces commander present. By joint 
area services agreement, all other Armed Forces in the area are 
normally required to submit requirements for locally available 
supplies, services, or facilities to a central purchasing agency 
for purchasing action. However, in those areas where no locally 
established supply channels exist for local purchase, the 
purchasing officer may be required to initiate action to purchase 
certain locally available, common use-type items, services, or 
facilities for the accomplishment of the unit's mission. The 
methods and procedures to be utilized in fulfilling these 
requirements, until such time as support is available through 
locally established supply channels or as directed by higher 
authority, are contained herein. (Ref. 6: 8201.1) 
 
In these instances, contracting support may be provided through another Government or 
DoD agency established as the lead agency.    
The Army has adopted the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) 
program for logistical support for operations overseas.  MEUs have received support 
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from the LOGCAP contractors in both Kuwait and the Balkans during the many 
deployments to those areas since they became trouble spots.  Access to these contractor 
services requires the MEU to provide funding to the local Army command’s resource 
management office and to send requirements through the local contracting office. 
2.  CONUS Support  
If the MEU is not able to contract their requirements in the country in which they 
are operating, they can submit the requisition back to the supporting SMU.  The deployed 
Support Unit in the Supply Battalion of the supporting FSSG will arrange for the 
contracting and shipment of all CONUS based support. 
G. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
This chapter demonstrated that there are a multitude of options open to the MEU 
for contracting support while deployed.  Internal assets can be extensive with a 3044, a 
MEU contracting officer with ordering officer authority or contracting warrant, the 
GCPC credit card and additional MEU supply personnel trained as ordering officers.  If 
internal contracting assets are not available, there are many means of receiving the proper 
support.  The NRCCs and other agencies deployed to an area have the capacity to meet 
all the needs of the Marine Expeditionary Units.  The next chapter will introduce and 
analyze the results of the researcher's survey and compare the different internal support 







IV.  ANALYSIS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
This chapter introduces the researcher’s survey of 3044s and analyzes the data 
from the responses.  Additionally, the researcher will compare the different internal 
support alternatives available to the MEU. 
B. SUMMARY OF SURVEY DATA COLLECTED  
The survey of 3044s was solicited through an E-Mail distributed by the researcher 
to the Headquarters Marine Corps enlisted contracting chief, and each of the base and 
contingency contracting officers.  The E-Mail contained a link to the survey which was 
web based through Naval Postgraduate School.  There were 16 questions, seven of which 
pertained to all 3044s.  The nine remaining questions were directed at 3044s who had 
deployed with a MEU.  Appendix G lists the survey questions.  There were 47 
respondents, 6 of which had MEU contracting experience.  Question number one asked 























Figure 5.  Survey question 1 results. 
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Question number two asked for total time in service.  The average time in service 
for the respondents was 13 years, 3 months.  The range of years of service was from four 
years, three months to 23 years, two months.  Question 2 data: 
Range Mean Median Mode 
4 yrs, 3 mos-23 yrs, 2 mos 13 yrs, 3 mos 13 years 8 years 
Table 6.  Survey question 2 results. 
Question number three asked for total time in MOS.  The average time in MOS 
was seven years, three months.  The range of time in MOS was from one year to 19 
years.  Three respondents had less than two years in MOS and were still in their two year 
probationary period.  Question 3 data:   
Range Mean Median Mode 
1 year -19 years 7 years 6 years 2 years 
Table 7.  Survey question 3 results 
Question 4 asked if they had deployed as a 3044 not with a MEU.  Deployed time 
included permanent change of station (PCS) tours to Okinawa, Japan of either one or 
three years.  Twenty-eight had deployed as a 3044.  Of the 19 who had not yet deployed 
as a 3044, twelve had fewer than four and one half years time in the MOS and only five 
had time in MOS greater than the mean in the below chart.  The 3044 with the longest 
time in the MOS of all respondents had never spent any time deployed.  The data below 
are for time in MOS for only those Marines who hadn’t deployed: 
Range Mean Median Mode 
1 year -19 years 5 yrs, 9 mos 3 years 2 years 
Table 8.  Survey results for Non-deployed 3044s time in MOS 
Question 5 asked for deployments and the lengths of the deployments.  Twenty-
eight respondents had deployed for a total of 368 months (including time deployed with 
MEUs).  Forty-four percent of the deployed time was either in the Balkans or PCS to 
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Okinawa:  63 months in the Balkans and 99 months in Okinawa.  Another 54 months was 
deployed with MEUs.  The deployed time consisted of 69 deployments, 44 of which 
involved operations/exercises other than deployments to Okinawa, the Balkans, and with 
a MEU.  Therefore 63.8% of the deployments accounted for 41% of the deployed time.  
The average length of these deployments was 3.5 months.  The following chart shows the 
mean deployed time for only those 3044s who had deployed, and the mean for all 
respondents: 
Range Mean those deployed Mean for all respondents  
2 months – 36 months 13.6 months 8 months 
Table 9.  Survey results 3044 deployed time 
Therefore with an average time in MOS for all respondents of seven years, only 
an average of 8 months was spent deployed.  However, the first two years of the MOS is 
spent in a probationary period when they do not deploy, so it is an average 8 months 
deployed out of five years when they are eligible for deployment.  This means that the 
MOS is deployed approximately 13% of the time (8 out of 60 months).  The typical 
service member today spends close to 20 percent of his time deployed. (Ref. 20)  The 
average for the MOS is less than all service members during their time in the MOS.  Of 
the 28 with deployed time, 5 were above the service average of 20%.  The Marine Corps 
has started tracking these deployed days and 1 March 2001 started placing it on the Leave 
and Earnings Statement (LES).  (Ref. 21)   
The Congress was concerned about the frequency of deployments during the 
deliberations on the fiscal year 2000 National Defense Authorization Act.  As part of that 
legislation they provided that service members be paid $100 per day for each day 
deployed in excess of 400 in a two-year period. (Ref. 21)  The effective date of the Act is 
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1 October 2000, so no service members are eligible yet.  Although the data cannot be 
broken done by two-year period, only six of the 28 with deployed time had spent over 
400 days deployed in their MOS.               
Question six asked if the chance to deploy was a major consideration in moving to 
the 3044 MOS.  Thirty-four or 72 % of the 47 respondents replied no. 
Question seven asked if the respondents felt they deployed too often, just enough, 
or not enough.  Six of the respondents did not answer this question, the only question 
open to all 3044s that was not answered by all respondents.  12 of the respondents did not 
believe 3044s deployed enough, while 23 felt they deployed just enough.      
 

























Figure 6.  Survey question 7 results. 
 
It would appear from unsolicited comments later in the survey in which two 
respondents felt the need to comment on this closed ended question, that the problem 
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may not lie in frequency of deployments, but who deploys.  Ms. Shari Durand, the 
Director of Contracts at Headquarters Marine Corps, also echoed this concern in a 
personal interview. (Ref. 10)  The quotes from the survey are as follows: 
I don’t think 44s (3044s) as a whole deploy to much, I think the manning 
of the FSSGs is where we are going wrong. In my opinion the FSSGs are 
manned with Marines who come from another FSSG, and Base Marines 
go to Base. Also, it seems the monitor and MOS liaison officer rely on 
volunteers to man the FSSGs. So to rewrite your question, Do 44s in the 
FSSGs deploy to much? No. 
Question 7 is a "loaded" question because if the 3044 Marine is stationed 
with a base unit he/she experiences little or no deployment time. 
Conversely, a Marine stationed with the FSSG in support of a MEU, that 
Marine is deployed too often. My recommendation is to convert all of the 
Marines to base units. Have the "base" Marines be in support of their 
designated region. By creating a larger pool of Marines for deployment 
would balance out each Marine's deployment time regardless of the base 
or FSSG designation. 
The Marines who deploy come out of the FSSG, while the base Marines do not 
deploy.  Without a tracking system a Marine can go from base billet to base billet without 
ever deploying.     
The demographics of the six 3044s who answered question seven that they 
believed that 3044s deployed too often are as follows: 
Time in MOS Time deployed 
8 yrs, 9 mos 11 months 
7 yrs, 10 mos 12 months 
6 yrs, 9 mos 6 mos 
6 yrs, 9 mos 12 mos 
3 yrs, 9 mos 0 mos 
11 yrs, 10 mos 2 mos 
Table 10.  Demographics of 3044s who thought 3044s deployed too often  
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Questions eight through 16 were answered only by the six 3044s who had 
deployed with a MEU.  Question eight asked how many MEU deployments they had 
done.  Three did two deployments and the other three respondents did two deployments.  
Question 9 asked the dollar value of the warrant they deployed with.  All responded up to 
the simplified acquisition threshold (SAT) (one had deployed when the SAT was 
$25,000).  Question 10 asked if they had to write any contracts while deployed that were 
greater than the SAT.  None had.  Two replied that they had commitments greater than 
the SAT they were able to make delivery orders against the MLS contract to satisfy the 
commitments.  Question 11 asked if any other MEU personnel had a contracting warrant.  
No respondent deployed with another warranted contractor, only with ordering officers.  
Question 12 asked if the ARG split while they deployed, only two responded yes.  
Question 13 asked how the 3044 felt about his workload as a MEU contract specialist.  
Two-thirds believed it to be at least moderately challenging: 
Among the most challenging assignments I have had in 
the Marine Corps 
1 
Moderately Challenging 3 
Constantly looking for things to occupy time 1 
Talents were completely wasted 1 
Table 11.  Survey results to question 13.  
Question 14 asked the respondents opinion of going back out on deployment with 
a MEU.  The results below show that at least two-thirds would not take a negative view 





Would seek out an opportunity 1 
Happy with some reservations 2 
No strong feeling, just another billet 1 
Would rather not 2 
Table 12.  Survey results to question 14 
Question 15 asked whether they would recommend a tour with a MEU to their 
fellow 3044s.  The data below show that 5 out of 6 would recommend a tour to a fellow 
3044.  Again this shows a generally positive feeling of deploying with a MEU: 
Would highly encourage 2 
Would encourage it 3 
Would not encourage it 1 
Table 13.  Survey results for question 15 
Whereas the last three questions showed an overall positive experience from 
working on the MEU, question 16 asked the 3044 any difficulties they encountered while 
contracting during their tours with MEUs.  These comments fell into three categories.  
The first category dealt with the requirements of the billet.  The first three comments 
below followed a theme of being underutilized as a “glorified credit card holder” and 
losing knowledge in their MOS performing non-contracting duties.  The following are 
responses received concerning the work requirements: 
I feel that assigning a 3044 to the East Coast MEUs is a waste of a billet. 
This Marine cannot exercise his contracting authority unless he is 
deployed out of the Camp LeJeune area. So, for most of his assignment, he 
is used as nothing more than a glorified credit card holder. Most of his 
deployment time is used placing delivery orders against an established 
Navy IDIQ contract. These actions can be supported by additional GCPC 
holders and Ordering Officers. If true contracting support is required, a 
3044 can always be augmented to the MEU In the same manner that 
critical billets are augmented.  (An East Coast 3044 assigned to a MEU is 
normally assigned for 2 years, 6-8 months work-up, 6 month deployment, 
6-8 month work-up and 6 month deployment.) 
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Many times you see yourself doing jobs outside of your MOS. Believe me 
there is nothing wrong with that, but when you are away for six months 
losing knowledge and understanding of the changes that have taken place 
in Acquisitions during that time frame. It hurts when you are trying to fall 
back into the place of knowledge that you had before that time frame. 
 
While the Acquisition field going paperless and doing a lot of purchasing 
through the internet, the need of a 3044 at a MEU is a not required. 
Especially if there is a Contingency they will send a 3044 out there to 
support.  There seems to be a waste of our knowledge when it comes 
down to the MEUs. 
 
The second category of comments related to their relationship to the command 
staff.  Generally, the comments reflected that the MEU staff did not properly consult the 
3044 in planning, did not rely on their knowledge, or didn’t exactly understand what they 
needed to perform their mission.  The following were such comments:      
For a 3044 to be effective in a MEU billet his billet has to be respected, 
and he has to be respected as the duty expert in his MOS. I found that 
dealing with the MEU staff, there was always someone trying to speak for 
the contractor to answer contracting issues without having the knowledge, 
experience or authority to make those decisions. The S4, S4A, and SUPO 
were often the offenders.  Unauthorized commitments was another issue 
which could have been avoided if contracting support had been requested. 
Another case of the MEU staff not understanding the 3044 capabilities or 
not seeking them out. 
 
Getting the command to understand that the contract specialist must have 
freedom to work independently of the command. Most commands want to 
keep control of the individual to the point where he or she must always 
give an account of their whereabouts at all times. 
 
There could have been better planning for commodities on their behalf.  I 
would recommend giving just a brief introduction of the contracting 
process to the staff (e.g. S3, S4, G3, G4) of any deployable unit. 
Regardless of rank, contracting specialists should get to attend any 
conferences that apply to the planning stages for any type of exercise. It 






The third category of comments related to the short fused nature of requests:   
Fulfilling last minute requirements due to poor planning, and not having a 
detailed description of the service or supply required. This often led to 
wasted funds and time.” 
 
The only difficulty that I came upon was trying to obtain very important 
items at the last minute. As always trying to obtain US items in Europe is 
not always easy. The job itself was easy if you put your mind towards 
what had to be done. 
  
The most difficult was the ‘gotta have it yesterday no matter what’ 
attitude.  This starts with Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) and 
then lasts until return to CONUS.  The MEU does not understand 
contracting rules.  This can make things very difficult. 
A few of the above comments also were related to the urgency of need for all 
requirements.  There is great pressure on the contracting officer to get things on a short 
notice.  This can lead to pressures to circumvent the system or take short cuts.  Although 
none expressed this problem, it can be a source of tension when your boss is the one 
bringing the requirements to you.  In this environment there is no independence of the 
contracting officer. 
C. OVERVIEW OF SURVEY DATA  
The researcher believes that two primary conclusions can be drawn from the data 
collected from the survey.  The first conclusion is that overall the deployment rate for the 
MOS is not excessive.  There may be a problem with the distribution of who deploys as 
discussed earlier.  The second conclusion is that although the 3044s who had deployed 
with a MEU generally viewed their deployment(s) with a MEU as positive experiences, 
they felt their talents were underutilized.  They felt that the time deployed was not the 
best use of their skills.     
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D. COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES  
There are four sources of internal contracting support available to the MEU 
Commander for deployments.  The first source is to deploy with an enlisted contract 
specialist.  Second, the MEU SupO can receive a warrant up to the SAT.  Third, MEU 
personnel can be appointed ordering officers against government contracts.  Lastly, the 
GCPC credit card limit can be raised to $25,000.  If the commander can arrange for the 
training of his personnel prior to deployment, he can deploy with all four capabilities.  
This discussion will address each of these alternatives separately.   
1.  Enlisted Contract Specialists 
Having a 3044 on the MEU staff provides optimal flexibility to the MEU 
commander.  It is an asset he knows he will have when he leaves on a deployment in 
which his itinerary is uncertain.  Even though a few of the respondents to the survey 
addressed being included in planning as a deficiency, in the case of contingency 
operation, the 3044 is available for planning immediately upon receipt of the warning 
order.  Additionally he will have familiarity with the unit he will be supporting.  He 
understands the command, its missions, equipment, and may be able to detect gaps in 
support requests.  
There is a definite contrast to the overall feeling about the necessity of 3044s from 
the point of view of the 3044 and the MEU SupO.  Each of the east coast MEU SupOs 
interviewed felt strongly about the need to deploy with a 3044.  On the other hand, the 
general feeling from the 3044s is that although the experience is worthwhile, they felt 
underutilized, as in the words of one 3044: “a glorified credit card holder”.  The 
environment that the east coast deploys in is the most developed of the MEUs and has 
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established contracts that meet near all requirements.  This is far different from the 
environments faced by deployments from the west coast, which does not have anything 
like a one stop shopping instrument like the MLS contract.   
A concern expressed by MgySgt Brown, the head of enlisted contracting 
headquarters Marine Corps, was that 3044s were not being returned to the FSSG upon 
conclusion of the deployment.  He expressed the need for these Marines to get back to the 
FSSG so that they can resume their contracting training.  They join the MEU at E-180 for 
pre-deployment workups and normally stay through two deployments.  They support the 
MEU during the pre-deployment exercises much like the Camp Pendleton base 
contracting office supports the west coast MEUs during the same training.  During the 
six-month post deployment period, there is little contracting work required for a 
command element that shrinks in size to less than 30 depending on rotations of personnel.  
He believed that this time was better spent working in the FSSG contingency contracting 
office. (Ref. 12)   
When not deployed, the 3044s work for the FSSG contingency contracting officer 
(CCO).  The two CONUS based CCOs both expressed difficulties in getting deployed 
time for their Marines in support of exercises/operations.  The 3rd FSSG CCO in Okinawa 
expressed no such concern since his Marines routinely function in a deployed 
environment.  In fact he mentioned an interest in decreasing deployed days. (Ref. 22)  
The current 1st FSSG CCO, who does not provide a 3044 to the MEUs at this time was 




E-180 (beginning of pre-deployment workups) is too far out.  3044 is a 
low density MOS, and should be treated similarly to disbursing and other 
last minute joins to the MEU.  E-90 is better, but even then, only on a less 
than full time basis.  Having a 3044 assigned to each MEU would render 
the CCO incapable of handling its other missions (Ref. 11) 
 
Major Begin further addressed other benefits of expanding the Marines 
experiences as a Marine.  He thought it would be good for an “office pogue” (derogatory 
term for Marine who works in the office, vice one that spends a lot of time in the field) to 
experience the challenges of ship life.  The previous 1st FSSG CCO had a much stronger 
feeling against the deployment of 3044s with west coast MEUs: 
This would be an exercise in futility.  A 3044 is a wasted talent on a six-
month deployment supporting a MEU.  Eighty percent of the contracting 
actions would be in the form of credit card purchases.  The remaining 
contracting actions that exceed the micro-purchase level will be handled 
by a theater contracting command. (Ref. 23: p 3) 
 
When asked if they thought they would be able to fully employ a 3044, each of 
the west coast MEU SupOs said no.  Since half of the deployment is spent in transit to 
and from the AOR, the 3044 would have large stretches where he would be looking for 
things to do to keep him busy.  The theme was that proper advanced planning during pre-
deployment planning conferences decreased the likelihood of difficulties experienced 
during deployment.  The preferred method of support currently provided is to have a 
contracting officer from the NRCC at the exercise/operation site.  When asked which 
they preferred:  deploy with a 3044, the current method of support, or the SupO receive a 
warrant, the unanimous answer was for the MEU SupO to receive a warrant.  The 
researcher believes that this is because it gives them maximum control of their success.  
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This is evident in the quote from Capt Tucker, the only MEU SupO interviewed who had 
deployed with a warrant, in the following section.   
Another issue brought up by the SupOs was the need for the 3044 to attend the 
pre-deployment planning conferences and to be a member of the exercise advanced party.  
The conferences cost anywhere from $5,000-$10,000 per attendee depending on the 
countries traveled to.  Until fiscal year 2000, these costs were charged to higher 
headquarters as Traditional CINC Activities (TCA) funds.  They are now funded by the 
MEU.   
2.  Warrant the MEU SupO up to SAT 
Either in addition, or instead of deploying with a 3044, the MEU SupO can 
receive a warrant to support the MEU.  He would bring the same capabilities as the 3044, 
which would mean that he could procure almost all requirements of the MEU.  The 
minimum training requirement for a Marine to receive a warrant under the SAT is the 
same as for an ordering officer appointment.  MCO P4200.15G describes these 
requirements and who can issue the warrant: 
1. … Appointment of contracting officers below the small purchase 
threshold for the activities listed in paragraph 2003 (FSSG CCO) shall be 
in writing, by name, and issued by the chief of the regional contracting 
office designated to support such activities. Appointments as contracting 
officer will be done via a contracting officer Certificate of Appointment 
(SF 1402), which will specify the level of purchasing authority 
authorized. Copies of all contracting officers warrants issued 
shall be maintained in the permanent file of the activity and will be 
retained for a period of not less than 5 years after each 






2. Authority of contracting officers appointed by the chief of a 
regional contracting office will be limited to small purchase 
open-market authority not to exceed the small purchase threshold 
and delivery order authority up to the maximum order limitation.   These 
warrants will specify that they are only valid for the activity to which 
attached. These contracting officers shall be under the direction of the 
chief contracting office making the appointment. 
3. Prior to appointment of contracting officers, the individual 
shall, as a minimum, have completed the Purchasing Fundamentals Course 
(Pur 101) (formerly Defense Small Purchase Course). (Ref. 6: para. 2101) 
 
The 31st MEU is the only MEU to deploy with a warranted Supply Officer.  The 
warrant was provided by the Regional Contacting Officer (RCO) at Camp Butler, 
Okinawa and contingent upon the stipulation that the SupO would only use it when there 
was no other contracting officer at the exercise/operation site.  Capt Tucker, the first 
Supply Officer to deploy with a contracting warrant up to the SAT loved the flexibility it 
provided him.  He used it during two separate deployments in Korea and Australia.  He 
preferred it to the NRCC: 
It provided me huge flexibility.  I didn’t like the bureaucracy of the 
NRCC…Contracting people like to say no.  When I go through the NRCC 
I lose the authority and independence.  If you are going to be the one 
responsible, why can’t you have the authority? (Ref. 24) 
 
He felt that any supply officer should be able to handle the responsibilities.  A 
person with good organizational skills would be able to handle it easily.  He depended on 
his fiscal and supply chiefs for assistance in administering contracts and ensuring 
delivery when he was not available.  He did not experience split ARG ops during either 
of his deployments.   
As addressed in Chapter III, the MLS contract is a requirements contract for both 
the Navy and the Marine Corps, which in effect ties the east coast MEUs to that contract.  
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The 31st MEU SupO was not tied to requirements contracts with a husbanding 
contractor.  Husbanding contracts in that AOR do not bind the Marine Corps specifically.  
This can have two effects.  First he can compete for lower prices as Captain Tucker 
mentioned paying as little as ¼ what the Navy paid in Townsville, Australia.  Second, it 
means more work by the SupOs to perform market research to locate competition.  With 
urgent items, as most tend to be with the MEU; it seems probable that market research 
and competition was limited.  He experienced no contracts near $100,000 with only two 
above $25,000, which was the limit of his purchase card.    
There are concerns with using a MEU SupO as a warranted contracting officer.  
He is closely involved with the unit and will like the 3044 be pressed to circumvent the 
regulations or cut corners to provide support on a short notice.  It will require discipline 
on the part of the SupO to do the right thing.  The one advantage the 3044 has over the 
SupO in this regard is that his additional training will have imbedded the correct 
purchasing procedures into his actions more strongly.  The 3044 will have had at least 
two years of base contracting work compared to a couple weeks of class time for the 
SupO.  A counter to this pressure to cut corners due to time constraints is that the MEU 
SupO also holds the purse strings.  He has an incentive to get competition to seek out the 
best price because he has to be especially wary of the bottom-line.  Marine Corps SupOs 
are notorious for being frugal and good at economizing.     
A previous NPS thesis student proposed that Contracting Officers be placed on 
the staffs of the Marine Expeditionary Units. (Ref. 25: p. 106)  Although it was not the 
purpose of his thesis to explore the workload that these billets would accord a contracting 
officer, it is obvious that if 3044s feel they are underutilized during deployments, then an 
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education at NPS would be a great waste in these billets.  However, these billets could be 
used to incorporate current Supply Officers into the contracting field.  In addition to the 
NAVSUP training course, when their pre-deployment schedule allows, MEU SupOs 
could attend Defense Acquisition University (DAU) classes to enhance their knowledge.  
DAU courses such as CON 234, Contingency Contracting would provide additional 
knowledge in challenging situations.  Those SupOs who show an aptitude and preference 
could be singled out for additional training and follow on assignments in contracting as 
required.  This would give the Marine Corps a separate pipeline for Contracting Officers 
outside the NPS pipeline and the 18-month time investment that comes with it.   
3.  Ordering Officer Capability 
The west coast MEUs do not take advantage of the training required for this 
ability; however still perform the duties with the husbanding contractors.  All other 
MEUs take advantage of the training.  As nearly all contracting is provided through the 
use of the MLS husbanding services requirements contract, this ability is vital to the 
success of the east coast MEU deployments.  One of the MEUs provided the training to 
three additional personnel to assist the MEU SupO and 3044 in case the MEU operates in 
multiple locations.  As shown in paragraph 2.a.4 of Appendix B, the appointing order for 
a for an east coast MEU SupO as an ordering officer, they can only make orders against 
husbanding contracts written and administered by the NRCC Naples, Italy or the Fleet 
Industrial Supply Center (FISC), Norfolk, Virginia.  Access to Army Contracted 
Logistics Support (CLS) or other such contracts in theater would have to be accessed 
through the appropriate joint command, as currently required with a 3044.  Although the 
most recent MEU SupOs have deployed with ordering limits of $25,000 there is nothing 
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in the NAVSUPINST 4200.85 or MCO P4200.15G that precludes them from receiving 
authority up to the SAT. 
4.  Government-wide Commercial Purchase Card   
As a warranted contracting officer, the 3044 that deploys with the MEUs 
possesses a credit card with the same limit as his warrant, up to the SAT or $100,000.  
This provides maximum flexibility to use this card as a contracting instrument and not 
just as a method of payment.  31st MEU deploys with a limit of $25,000 and the west 
coast MEUs limit is $2,500.  These cards can be valuable purchase instruments in 
developed countries like those that host most of the deployment exercises.  This 
researcher had problems getting vendors in Mombasa, Kenya willing to take the GCPC in 
1999.  Cash is the preferred method of payment in these countries.   
The GCPC is especially undependable in contingency operations.  Other than our 
contingency responses to Saddam Hussein in Kuwait, underdeveloped, third world 
countries are the most likely places we will deploy for contingency operations.  As after 
action reports for exercise Operation Restore Hope demonstrate, use of the GCPC will 
not normally be a factor inside the country where the contingency is taking place.  Inside 
these the countries the infrastructure will normally be so diminished that credit cards will 
not be accepted for payment.  In these cases, supplies may be purchased and transported 
in from another country.      
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY  
The MEU contracting requirements can be procured, with few exceptions under 
the simplified acquisition threshold.  The use of a contracting warrant up to the simplified 
acquisition threshold by either a MEU SupO or a 3044 will give the MEU most of the 
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capabilities it needs.  Only on those rare occasions that it has a procurement greater than 
$100,000 will it need assistance from a contracting officer from the NRCC.  Because of 
the capabilities of the MLS contract, the east coast MEUs are in a particular enviable 
contracting environment.  There is rarely a need to write any contracts.  An ordering 
officer can accomplish most of their procurements with a limit up to the limit of the 
contract.  This is a big reason why 3044s who have supported MEU deployments in the 
past tend to feel that their talents are being underutilized during these deployments.  The 
GCPC can also be a valuable purchasing tool in developed countries, especially if the 
MEU takes advantage of the training available to receive a $25,000 single purchase limit.   
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       V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
A. INTRODUCTION  
This study has explained the differences between the areas of responsibility for 
each of the MEUs, likely missions, and how each of the MEFs have supported MEUs 
while deployed.  The researcher has also explained the capabilities of the available 
support methods.  Additionally, the survey of enlisted contract specialists has 
demonstrated that as a whole the MOS is not excessively deployed and the addition of 
deployments in support of the west coast MEUs would not overtax the MOS.  In fact the 
CONUS CCOs are concerned with getting enough deployed time for their Marines.  This 
chapter presents conclusions and recommendations for the support of deployed MEUs.  It 
also answers the research questions that were introduced in Chapter I and recommends 
areas for further research.  
B. CONCLUSIONS  
The data collected from the survey and the material presented throughout this 
study have enabled the researcher to reach the following conclusions: 
1.  The operations tempo of the 3044s can support CONUS based MEU 
deployments.  Both CCOs expressed an interest in keeping their Marines employed in 
overseas exercises.  The training of contracting in an overseas environment cannot be 
simulated anywhere else other than to get the Marines involved in these exercises.  The 
results of the survey clearly show that the addition of the west coast MEUs to the 
deployment cycle would not overly stress these Marines.  
2.  MEU SupOs are capable of performing the duties as contracting officer while 
deployed, but they should be restricted to use experienced contracting personnel when 
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available.  Although they are personally involved with the unit generating the 
requirements, they also have a great incentive to perform in the best interests of the 
Government because they also perform duties as the budgeting officer.  These officers 
generally have rudimentary knowledge of the acquisition of the acquisition system from 
their involvement on the support side with base contracting offices.   
3.  West coast MEU SupOs are not receiving the proper training to assume duties 
as ordering officers while deployed or taking advantage of the ability to increase their 
GCPC single purchase limit to $25,000.  Even though they have been placing orders with 
and being supported by husbanding contractors, none of the west coast MEU SupOs 
received the requisite training.    
4.  Because of the differences in external contracting asset available in each of the 
MEUs AORs, it is not preferable to standardize internal support for all seven MEUs.  
However, the support provided can be enhanced.  Because of the heavy deployment 
cycles of 3rd FSSG 3044s, it is not practical to recommend that 31st MEU deploy with a 
3044.  It is practical to recommend that the MEU SupO continue to deploy with a 
contracting warrant because of the frequency with which they conduct joint exercises and 
have other contracting support assets to go to for assistance and the low dollar total of 
contracting required.  The east coast MEUs, however need a 3044 least of all even though 
they are the only ones that deploy with one.  The current MLS contract provides far 
superior contracting support as compared to the AORs for the west coast and 31st MEUs.  
However since the deployment schedule is much busier than the west coast MEUs, the 
3044 provides added flexibility to the MEU SupO with an extra asset for split ARGs.  
West coast MEUs are heavily dependent on the NRCC to provide a contracting officer 
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for their exercises and a contracting capability would greatly enhance the MEUs 
capabilities.      
C. RECOMMENDATIONS  
From analyzing the data collected and the material presented throughout this 
study, the researcher makes the following recommendations: 
1.  The 1st FSSG CCO should provide an enlisted contract specialist in support of 
the west coast MEU exercises.  At E-180 he should make the 3044 available to the MEU 
to attend planning conferences in the exercise AOR and in direct support to contract 
MEU pre-deployments.  This would start to build the supporting relationship prior to 
deployment.  Since the first month and a half is generally transit time with sustainment 
training that is directly supported by base contracting offices in Hawaii and Singapore, 
the 3044 would fly in to meet the advance party in support of the operation.  This is no 
different from what they experience with a NRCC rep that provides support.  They would 
stay with the MEU to contract their requirements until the MEU starts it departure from 
the AOR for their home base.  During the entire deployment period the 3044 would have 
to be available to leave within 12 hours notice to join the MEU to support a contingency 
operation.  Again, this is not very different from current contingency support plans; a 
contracting officer would be called to fly to site of the operation..  This maximizes 
training time for the 3044 in his MOS and also improves support to the MEU because 
they have a dedicated contracting officer that they have experience working with and is 
familiar with the needs of the unit.        
2.  The 3044s should provide assistance on the same basis as stated above for the 
west coast during pre-deployment and return within 30 days after deployment.  However 
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they join the MEU just prior to deployment and conduct the entire deployment with the 
MEU.  Since these MEUs are more likely to do split operations, it provides the MEU 
Commander greater flexibility to have the 3044 throughout the deployment.  Because of 
the shorter transit time, there is less time between exercises.  It is important that the 3044 
return to the FSSG CCO within 30 days of the end of deployment so that the CCO can 
monitor his MOS training.     
3.  All three FSSG CCOs work with the MEU SupOs to arrange the training 
necessary for the MEU SupO to receive a contracting warrant up to the SAT.  The MEU 
SupO can deploy with a warrant up to the SAT with the proper training to provide 
maximum flexibility to the MEU.  It would be up to the discretion of the FSSG CCO to 
determine whether the SupO has the requisite knowledge to use this warrant.  MEU 
SupOs normally do two deployments.  Arranging additional training during the year 
between deployments can enhance the skills that are learned for one deployment.  At the 
conclusion of the three years with the MEU, the Marine Corps would benefit from having 
additional trained deployed contracting personnel.  These officers could then be available 
to fill other Marine Corps contracting positions.   In the short run, the MEU SupO would 
deploy with an enlisted contract specialist in direct support of his exercises and 
contingencies.  As the CCOs get more valuable training opportunities in joint 
environments and the deployment cycles cannot be met, the MEU SupO would deploy as 
the sole internal contracting option.  The local NRCC will continue to be available for 
assistance as required.          
4.  FSSG CCOs should continue to press the need for 3044s to get billets in joint 
overseas exercises with their respective MEF and MARFOR headquarters.  Deployments 
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with east coast MEUs are not the best alternative for overseas contracting experience.  
The routine nature of making orders against existing contracts and GCPC purchases can 
be accomplished by most competent non-contracting personnel, that is why NAVSUP 
provides four day classes for these individuals.  The challenging assignments are with 
deployments in support of joint exercises and contingency operations overseas.  
Contingency operations are conducted in a joint environment and our 3044s need the 
experiences of working alongside Army and Air Force contingency contractors to gain 
from their experiences.  We must get our 3044s more experience in these exercises so 
that we can justify their inclusion in contracting cells for contingencies when they occur.   
D. SUMMARY AND REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS  
This study sought to answer six secondary research questions presented in 
Chapter I in order to find a complete answer to the primary research question of:  What is 
the United States Marine Corps' experience with contract support of deployed Marine 
Expeditionary Units (MEUs) and how might this information be used to enhance the 
support to deployed units?  All of the data, analyses, conclusions, and recommendations 
throughout this study have answered these questions.  
The first of the secondary research questions was:  What are the current USMC 
policies with respect to contract support and how does the USMC typically provide 
support to deployed MEUs?  This study has demonstrated that it is the Marine Corps’ 
policy to allow each of the MEFs to decide how best to support their MEUs.  Further, in 
chapter III, the researcher demonstrated the capabilities of the typical support methods 
that are employed by the MEUs from each MEF.   
The second question was:  What are the various types of contract support required 
by deployed MEUs?  Chapter II contained an evaluation of each of the types of 
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contracting support required by the MEUs II during the discussion of the typical MEU 
deployments.  Generally these requirements fall under the SAT and consist of 
transportation of personnel and assets, cell phones, portable toilets, garbage disposal, and 
other camp support type items. 
The third question was:  What are the current issues associated with the support 
methodologies chosen by the Marine Corps?  The major issues of increased use of 3044s 
in support of MEU deployments are whether the deployment tempo of the 3044s can 
support these additional deployments and whether it is a best use of these personnel.  The 
researcher believes that he has demonstrated that the deployment tempo could support the 
MEU, but that it is not necessarily the best use of the skills of an experienced 3044.  
The fourth question was:  Are the current methods of providing contract support 
adequate and responsive to deployed unit needs?  The current methods are adequate to 
support the MEUs, but not in all cases the most responsive.  Internal assets are more 
responsive because they have a personal stake in the success of the unit.  The additional 
administrative requirements placed by outside commands to access support can greatly 
increase the lead-time, especially as personnel get accustomed to using a new system.     
The fifth question was:  Are alternative contract support methods available to 
deployed units?  If so, what are the advantages and disadvantages associated with various 
contract support methodologies?  Alternative contract support methods were addressed in 
Chapter III.  Advantages and disadvantages were discussed for each method.  
The final secondary research question was:  How might the USMC alter current 
practices to enhance the level of support provided to deployed MEUs?  The 
recommendations above provide five improvements that enhance overall support of the 
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MEUs when deployed and better utilize Marine Corps personnel in support roles.  These 
recommendations will give the MEU commander more flexibility and will also benefit 
the Marine Corps by providing both its Supply Officers and 3044s more experience. 
E. SUGGESTED AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
This researcher recommends five areas for further research as a result of efforts to 
complete this study: 
 1.  Should we use the degree completion program to meet DAWIA requirements 
for 3044s?  To get our enlisted Marines up to the educational standards of DAWIA there 
are degree completion programs available, however the pay back tour for these Marines 
has not been in contracting billets.  Research could be conducted in how many slots per 
year would be required for this program and what payback billets would be appropriate. 
 2.  Base vs. FSSG Marines.  As brought out in the survey responses, there is a 
bias in who gets deployed and who doesn’t.  Research would be needed to provide the 
best use of Marines in garrison.  At each of the major stations, Camp Pendleton, Camp 
LeJeune, and Okinawa Marines either serve with base contracting office or the FSSG.  
The FSSG billets are deployable billets, while the base billets do not normally deploy.  
Recommendations would be required for the best use of these Marines and a more fair 
spread of deployed time for the Marines.  
 3.  Could we use supply school to provide contracting courses to SupOs and 
3044s?  Research could be conducted in the feasibility of contracting courses being 
provided at supply school for introductory contracting classes for MEU. 
 4.  Is our force structure for 3044s adequate?  Research can be conducted as to 
whether we have too many 3044s, not enough, or whether we need them at all.  If we are 
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having trouble getting our 3044s deployed time then maybe we have too many.  Do we 
need them in billets that we are not currently utilizing them?  Or should we leave the 
contingency contracting mission to the Army and the Air Force and depend on the NRCC 
for husbanding contracts as the Navy does?    
 5.  Could we use the Supply Officer MOS of 3002 as a feeder MOS for Marine 
Corps contracting officers?  The Marine Corps recognizes the extension of the supply 
field to contracting by using the enlisted Supply MOS exclusively to feed into the 
enlisted contracting field.  However the Corps accepts any officer MOS into the 
contracting MOS 9656.  Extending the supply MOS into contracting would eliminate the 
need of requiring officers outside their MOS, losing MOS credibility and then returning 
to their original MOS behind their peers.   
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APPENDIX A  
Marine Corps Enlisted Contracting Specialist Billets (Source: Headquarters Marine 
Corps Contracts Division) 
TONUM ORG DESC BILLET DESC RANK 
    
3
321F SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN PROCUREMENT CHIEF GYSGT 
3321F SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321F SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321F SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321F SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3321F SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3321F SUPP CO 1ST SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3321G SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT CHIEF GYSGT 
3321G SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321G SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321G SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321G SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3321G SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3321G SUPP CO 3D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3321S SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT CHIEF GYSGT 
3321S SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321S SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321S SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SSGT 
3321S SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3321S SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3321S SUPP CO 2D SUPP BN PROCUREMENT MAN SGT 
3512F HQSVCCO 1ST TRANS SPTBN PURCHASE/CONTRACT CLK SGT 
3512S HQSVCCO 2ND TRANS SPTBN PURCHASE/CONTRACT CLK SGT 
4929N H&S BN MARFORPAC CP SMITH PROCUREMENT CHIEF GYSGT 
4929N H&S BN MARFORPAC CP SMITH PURCHASING CLERK SGT 
4929N H&S BN MARFORPAC CP SMITH PURCHASING CLERK SGT 
4957P HQSVC CO MARFORLANT PURCHASING CHIEF GYSGT 
4957P HQSVC CO MARFORLANT PURCHASING SPEC SGT 
4958 CHEM-BIO INCIDNT RES CELL CONTRACTING SPECIALIST GYSGT 
4961N MARFOREUR CONTRACTING CHIEF SSGT 
4962N HQ MARFORSOUTH CONTRACTING CHIEF SSGT 
5055A MARCORSYSCOM QUANTICO VA CONTRACT SPECIALIST SSGT 
5103 I&L DEPT HQMC ADMIN SPT PROC CHIEF MGYSGT 
5103 I&L DEPT HQMC ADMIN SPT CONTRACTING SPECIALIST SSGT 
5114 AR DIV ADMIN SPT CONTRACTING CHIEF GYSGT 
5114 AR DIV ADMIN SPT PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SSGT 
5114 AR DIV ADMIN SPT PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SGT 
5133A MCSA MISSA HEAD CONTRACTING CHIEF MSGT 
5141 H-S CO MB 8TH-I WASH PROCUREMENT SUPPLY MAN GYSGT 
5141 H-S CO MB 8TH-I WASH PROCUREMENT SUPPLY MAN SGT 
5150 HQBN HQMC PROC SUPPLY CLERK SSGT 
7010A MARCORLOGBASES PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SSGT 
7010A MARCORLOGBASES PROCUREMENT SUP CHIEF MGYSGT 
7010A MARCORLOGBASES PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST GYSGT 
7010A MARCORLOGBASES PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST MSGT 
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7010A MARCORLOGBASES PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST GYSGT 
7010A MARCORLOGBASES PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SSGT 
7010A MARCORLOGBASES PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SGT 
7010B MC LOGISTIC BASE ALBANY PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SGT 
7010C MCLB BARSTOW BASE OPS PROCUREMENT CHIEF MSGT 
7010C MCLB BARSTOW BASE OPS PURCHASING/CONTRACT SPEC SSGT 
7211 MCRD SAN DIEGO BASE OPS PURCH & CONTR SPEC SSGT 
7211 MCRD SAN DIEGO BASE OPS PURCHASE & CONTRACT SPEC SGT 
7311A MCRD PARRIS ISLAND PURCHASING & CONTR SPEC GYSGT 
7311A MCRD PARRIS ISLAND PROCUREMENT CHIEF MSGT 
7311A MCRD PARRIS ISLAND PURCHASING & CONTR SPEC SGT 
7411 MCCDC PROCURE CHIEF MSGT 
7411 MCCDC PROCUR SPEC GYSGT 
7411 MCCDC PROCUR SPEC SSGT 
7411 MCCDC CONTRACTING SPECIALIST SSGT 
7511 MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS CONTRACT ADMINISTRATOR MSGT 
7511 MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS PURCHASING SPECIALIST SGT 
7511 MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS CONTRACT ADMINISTRATOR GYSGT 
7511 MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS PROC SUPPLY MAN SGT 
7511 MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS CONTRACT SPECIALIST SGT 
7511 MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS CONTRACT SURV REP SGT 
7511 MCB CAMLEJ BASE OPS CONTRACTING SPECIALIST GYSGT 
7611 MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS PROCUREMENT CHIEF GYSGT 
7611 MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS P & C SPECIALIST GYSGT 
7611 MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS P & C SPECIALIST SGT 
7611 MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS CONTRACTING SPECIALIST SSGT 
7611 MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS P & C SPECIALIST SGT 
7611 MCB CAMPEN BASE OPS PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SGT 
7671 MOUNTAIN WARFARE TRNG CTR CONTRACT/PURCHASING SPEC SSGT 
7711 MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS PROCUREMENT CHIEF GYSGT 
7711 MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS PROCUREMENT SPEC SGT 
7711 MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS PROCUREMENT SPEC SSGT 
7711 MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS BPA ADMINISTRATOR SGT 
7711 MCAGCC 29PALMS BASE OPS PROCUREMENT SPEC SGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS CONTRACTING CHIEF       MGYSGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS CONTRACT SPEC SSGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS CONTRACT SPEC GYSGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS CONTRACT SPEC SSGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN SSGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS PROCUREMENT SUPPLYMAN SGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS CONTRACT SPEC GYSGT 
7803 MCB CAMBUT BASE OPS PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST SGT 
7900 RESERVE BASE SUPPORT NOLA PROCUREMENT CHIEF MSGT 
7900 RESERVE BASE SUPPORT NOLA CONTRACTING SPECIALIST GYSGT 
7900 RESERVE BASE SUPPORT NOLA PURCHASING SPECIALIST SGT 
8221A MATSG PENSACOLA COMBINED PURCHASING NCOIC SSGT 
8365 H&HS MCAS MIRAMAR CONTRACT SPEC MSGT 
8365 H&HS MCAS MIRAMAR CONTRACT SPEC SSGT 
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APPENDIX B  
UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
Contingency Contracting Office 
2d Supply Battalion, 2d Force Service Support Group 
U. S. Marine Forces, Atlantic 
Camp LeJeune, North Carolina 28547-8368 
          4200 
          CCO 
          21 Sep 00 
 
From: Contracting Officer, 2d Supply Battalion, 2d Force             
  Service Support Group 
To:  Supply Officer, 22d MEU 
 
Subj: APPOINTMENT OF ORDERING OFFICER 
 
Ref: MCO 4200.15G 
 
1.  Appointment.  In accordance with the reference you are 
hereby appointed an Ordering Officer for the purposes set 
forth in paragraph 2 herein. Your appointment shall become 
effective 1 November 2000 and remain effective unless sooner 
revoked or you are reassigned to other than the 22d MEU.  
You are under the technical supervision of the Contracting 
Officer, 22d MEU, for your actions as an ordering officer. 
 
2.  Authority, Limitations and Requirements.  Your 
appointment is subject to the use of the method of purchase 
and to the limitations and requirements stated below: 
 
a. Subject to your ensuring that funds are available 
and that local purchase authority exists for the 
transaction, you may make purchases of class I, II, III, IV, 
VI and IX using the DD1155, Order for Supplies and Services, 
using pre-established Indefinite Delivery Type Contracts 
provided all of the following conditions are satisfied: 
 
(1) The aggregate amount of a purchase transaction 
is not in excess of $25,000. You shall not split purchases 
to avoid this monetary limitation. 
 
(2) Supplies are immediately available from the 
vendor. 
 
(3) One delivery and one payment shall be made. 
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(4) The IDTC contracts that delivery orders are 
placed against are awarded, administered and monitored by 
either the Naval Regional Contracting Center (NRCC), Naples. 
Italy or, the Fleet Industrial Supply Center (FISC), 
Norfolk, Virginia and are established for the provision of 
Husbandry Agent type services.  The use of any other IDTC 
contracts is prohibited. 
 
b. You are responsible for: 
 
(1) distributing and administering delivery orders 
that you place, 
 
(2) establishing controls necessary to ensure that 
all contract terms and conditions are met and that supplies 
or non-personal services ordered conform to contract 
requirements before acceptance is made or payment is 
authorized, and  
 
(3) reporting deficiencies in contractor 
performance promptly to the contracting officer who awarded 
the contract against which the delivery order was placed. 
 
You may not make any changes in the terms or conditions of 
any contracts against which you place delivery orders.  The 
authority stated above shall not be re-delegated to any 
other person. 
 
3. Assignment of Procurement Instrument Identification 
Numbers(PIIN).  The assignment of PIINs for use in placing 
the above referenced delivery orders shall be in accordance 
with those guidelines set forth in the Federal Acquisition 
Regulation and the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation. 
In accordance with the aforementioned you will assign each 
delivery order a (13) digit procurement instrument 
identification number. This number will be assigned as 
follows: 
 
• The first (6) digits will contain the UIC M68447 
• The 7th and 8th digits will represent the current 
fiscal year (e.g. 00 for FY 2000) 
• The 9th digit will be "D” thus citing the instrument as 
a "delivery order" 
• The last (4) digits will be a serial number.  Your 
block of serial numbers will begin with 2100 and 
continue through to 2199. These serial numbers will be 
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used sequentially and a new serial number will be used 
for each delivery order placed on a distinct IDTC. 
Serial numbers may remain the same for multiple 
delivery orders placed against the same Contract. 
 
Commensurate with PIIN assignment you will also assign a 
five digit sequencing number to track individual delivery 
orders placed against the same contract. In this case the 
first three digits of this sequencing number will begin with 
MSY and use a block of serial numbers beginning with 01 and 
ending with 99.  These numbers can be replicated as you 
issue new delivery orders on different contracts. 
 
4.  Standards of Conduct and Acquisition Reporting 
Requirements. 
 
a.  You shall comply with the standards as prescribed 
in DoD 5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation and shall review 
the regulation at least semiannually. 
 
b.  You shall furnish the Contracting Officer such  
information as may be required for acquisition reporting 
purposes in the manner and the time so specified. 
 
5.  Termination of Appointment. 
 
a. Your appointment may be revoked at any time by the 
Contracting Officer, 2d Supply Battalion, 2d FSSG and shall 
be terminated in writing except that no written termination 
of your appointment shall be made upon expiration or 
termination of contracts enumerated in paragraph 2. 
 
b. Should you be reassigned from your present position 
or Should your employment be terminated while this 
appointment is in effect, you shall promptly notify the 
appointing authority in writing so that your appointment may 
be terminated. 
 
c. Prior to departure from your current assignment, you 
shall report to this office for a review of your records for 
clearance. 
 
6.  Guidance.  Having been given the Ordering Officer 
authority cited herein you have also received training and 
guidance, both verbally and in written form, to be used when 
placing any and all delivery orders.  If at any time during 
your use of your authority you find that you are unsure of 
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the proper procedures to be used or of the limitations of 
your authority you shall immediately seek guidance. This 
guidance can be sought by contacting the Contracting Officer 
of either the 22d MEU or cognizant Contracting Officers 
within the 2d FSSG Contracting Office.  Where doubts linger, 
it is in your best interest to Preclude committing actions 
that you are unsure of until proper guidance has been 
provided. 
 
6.  All matters of question regarding this appointment 
Should be addressed to the Contracting Officer, 2d FSSG at 









UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS 
22d Marine Expeditionary Unit 
Special Operations Capable 




8 Nov 00 
 
From: Supply Officer, 22d MEU 
To:  Contracting Officer, 2d Supply Battalion 
Subj: ORDERING OFFICER APPOINTMENT 
 
1.  I, name of supply officer, certify I have been briefed 
and understand my duties and responsibilities as an ordering 
officer for the 22d MEU. I have read and understand DoD 
5500.7-R, Joint Ethics Regulation. 
 
2.  I will place loyalty to country, ethical principles, and 
law above private gain and other interests and perform my 
duties in keeping with the highest tradition of the military 
service and civilian service to the U. S. Government. 
 
3. I will avoid engaging in any personal business or 
professional activity or have or retain any direct or 
indirect financial interest which places me in a position in 
which there is a conflict or the appearance of a conflict 
between my private interests and the public interest of the 
United States as it relates to my duties and 
responsibilities as Department of Defense government 
personnel. 
 
4. I will accept no gifts or gratuities from those who have 
or seek business with the DoD or from those business 





  Signed, 
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APPENDIX C  
Mediterranean Fleet Husbanding Contractor’ s List  
Country  Med Ports  Agent  Port E-mail  Agent Mobile Phone  
MLS HQ  CDO, CEO, QMB  Mendoza, Ricardo 
Rafaraci, Thomas 
Rafaraci, Frank 
cdo@mls.com.mt  +39-335-848-5301 
+39-335-848-5302 
+39-335-848-5303 
ALBANIA  DURRES, 
SHENGJIN  Hyqmet, Hima  durres@mls.com.mt  +355-3820-21487  
ALGERIA  ALGIERS  Al Awwa, Abdel 
Awwa, Khaled Abdel 
Rahman 
algiers@mls.com.mt  +20-12-213-3985 
+20-12-213-6018 




Rieff, Johannes William 
  
CANARY 
ISLANDS  LAS PALMAS, TENERIFE  Delgado Rodriguez, Jacinto 
Gonzales Segura, Jose 
Lopez Agular, Ferico 





















CYPRUS  LARNACA, 
LIMASSOL  Solomonides, Gergios 





EGYPT  ALEXANDRIA, 
PORT SAID  
Awwa, Abdel 
Awwa, Khaled Abdel 
Rahman  
alexandria@mls.com.mt  +20-12-213-3985 
+20-12-213-6018  
FRANCE  ALL PORTS  Jacquelin, Stephanie 
Le Guay, Corinne 
Palmiero, Anna 
Palmiero, Mauro 




GIBRALTAR  GIBRALTAR  Mr. Tom Piner  tom.piner@gibnynex.gi  +350-0-77814  
+ 0-58 247 000  
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GREECE  ALL PORTS  Tzanakos, George 










ashdod@mls.com.mt  +972-58-315-224 
+972-58-315-222 
+972-58-315-223 
ITALY  ANCONA  Bruschi, Antonio  ancona@mls.com.mt  +39-0348-334-4569  
ITALY  ANZIO  Palmiero, Anna  anzio@mls.com.mt  +39-0335-679-7060  














ITALY  BARI  Di Benedetto, Antonio 
Di Benedetto, Vittorio  
bari@mls.com.mt  +39-339-263-2006  
ITALY  BRINDISI, 
TARANTO  Danese Paolo  brindisi@mls.com.mt 
taranto@mls.com.mt  
+39-(0)347-720-4556  
ITALY  CAGLIARI, LA 
MADDALENA  Mocci Antonio 
Pons Michele  
cagliari@mls.com.mt  +39-(0)335-811-2699 
+39-(0)335-811-2703  







ITALY  CROTONE  Di Benedetto Antonio  crotone@mls.com.mt  +39-339-263-2006  
ITALY  GAETA  Palmiero Anna  gaeta@mls.com.mt  +39-0335-679-7060  
ITALY  GIARDINI NAXOS  Rafaraci Frank    +39-0335-848-5303  
ITALY  LA SPEZIA  Pensa Euro Giorgio  laspezia@mls.com.mt  +39-0348-767-6725  
ITALY  NAPLES  Fariello Massimo  naples@mls.com.mt  +39-0335-699-8484  
ITALY  PORTO 
EMPEDOCLE  Palmiero Giuseppe Mauro    +39 -0335-223312/033-609786858  
ITALY  RIPOSTO  Rafaraci Frank  riposto@mls.com.mt  +39-0335-848-5303  
ITALY  SALERNO  Fariello Massimo  salerno@mls.com.mt  +39-335-699-8484  
ITALY  TRIESTE  Lonzar, Giampaolo 
Lonzar, Riccardo 
trieste@mls.com.mt  +39-335-810-5300/335-256-001 
+39-335-256-001 
ITALY  VENICE    venice@mls.com.mt    
MALTA  MALTA        
MONACO  MONTE CARLO  Jacquelin,Stephanie  monaco@mls.com.mt  0033-6-097-86864  
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MOROCCO  AL HOCEIMA        
PORTUGAL  FIGUEIRA DA 
FOZ        
SLOVENIA  KOPER  Margon Sasa  koper@mls.com.mt  0386-0-41-661-639  
SPAIN  ALGECIRAS        
SPAIN  ALICANTE  Sanchez Ruiz Alejandro alicante@mls.com.mt  0034-636-48-776  
SPAIN  ALMERIA  Del Amo Martinez Carlos almeria@mls.com.mt  0034-610-239-502  
SPAIN  ALTEA        
SPAIN  BARCELONA  Blanch Alfonso  barcelona@mls.com.mt  0034-629-464-146  
SPAIN  BENIDORM  Sanchez Ruiz Alejandro benidorm@mls.com.mt  0034-636-48-776  
SPAIN  CADIZ  Benitez Roca Fernando  cadiz@mls.com.mt  0034-649-913-719  
SPAIN  CARTAGENA    cartagena@mls.com.mt    
SPAIN  CASTELLON  Blanch Alfonso  castellon@mls.com.mt  0034-629-464-146  
SPAIN  CEUTA        
SPAIN  FERROL  Blanch Alfonso  ferros@mls.com.mt  0034-629-464-146  
SPAIN  IBIZA  Blanch Alfonso  ibiza@mls.com.mt  0034-629-464-146  
SPAIN  MAHON        
SPAIN  MALAGA    malaga@mls.com.mt    
SPAIN  PALAMOS    palamos@mls.com.mt    
SPAIN  PALMA DE 
MALLORCA  Riera Tony  palma@mls.com.mt  0034-629-401-340  
SPAIN  ROTA    rota@mls.com.mt    
SPAIN  SOLLER        
SPAIN  TARRAGONA    tarragona@mls.com.mt    
SPAIN  VALENCIA    valencia@mls.com.mt    
TUNISIA  BIZERTE  Kjeldsen Bennet  bizerte@mls.com.mt  00212-6-1-172-342  
TUNISIA  GABES        
TUNISIA  SFAX        
TUNISIA  SOUSSE        
TUNISIA  TUNIS  Fariello Massimo  tunis@mls.com.mt  0039-0335-699-8484  
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TURKEY  ANTALYA  Akincioglu, Hasan  antalya@mls.com.mt  0090-532-215-5166  
TURKEY  FETHIYE        
TURKEY  GOLCUK  Goksel Ziya  golkuk@mls.com.mt  0090-265-1568  
TURKEY  ISTANBUL  Goksel Ziya  istanbul@mls.com.mt  +90-212 244 2600/243 2118; 
Mob: +90 532 2319127  
TURKEY  IZMIR  Akincioglu, Hasan  izmir@mls.com.mt  0090-532-215-5166  
TURKEY  KABATEPE        
TURKEY  KARAAGAC        
TURKEY  MARMARIS  Akincioglu, Hasan  marmaris@mls.com.mt  0090-532-215-5166  
TURKEY  MERSIN        
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APPENDIX D  
West Africa Husbanding Contractor’ s List  









MUST BE WITH THIS 
OFFICE  











Off Tel: +44-1375-487-423 






ANGOLA  ALL  Joao A. Oliveira  jagostinho@ami.ebonet.net Off Tel: +244-2-447-523 
Off Fax: +244-2-442-776 
Mob: +244-9-508-556 
BENIN  ALL  Daniel Audren  daniel.audren@smtp.saga.fr Off Tel: +229-313-793 
Off Fax: +229-311-246 
Mob: +229-912-597 
Res: +229-330-489 
CAMEROON  ALL  Eric Vom Hoevel  eric.vom-hoevel@smtp.saga.fr Off Tel: +237-420-510 
Off Fax: +237-429-815 
Mob: +237-911-277 
Res: +237-370-164 
CAPE VERDE  ALL  Mark Porral 
(ISS coordination unit 
based in Gibraltar) 
iberia.navy@iss-shipping.com 
mark.porral@iss-shipping.com 
   
Off Tel: +350-79294 




ISLANDS  ALL  Valdemiro Ferreira  vikingcv@hotmail.com Off Tel: +238-31-7118 / 7119Off Fax: +238-31-7120 
Mob: +238-91-2053 




Off Tel: +242-94-08-55 
Off Fax: +242 – 94-3404 
Sat Tel: +871-761-373-498 





GUINEA  ALL  D Webster    Off Tel: +240-912-47 Off Tel: +240-926-82 
Off Fax: +240-916-46 
Mob: +240-952-54 
GABON  Port Gentil  Josephe Rouzaud  josephe.rouzaud@smtp.saga.fr Off Tel: +241-55-2190 
Off Fax: +241-55-2171 
Mob: +241-36-1331 
GAMBIA  ALL  N Langarddaard-
Sorensen  
gamship@ganet.gm Off Tel: +220-22-7432 
Off Fax: +220-22-7929 
Res: +220-49-6339 
GHANA  ALL  Alfred Acheampong  alfred.acheampong@smtp.saga.fr Off Tel: +233-22-204-130 
Off Fax: +233-22-202-175 
Mob: +233-27-200-149 
GUINEA  ALL  A. Niane  abdoulaye.niane@smtp.saga.fr Off Tel: +224-41-2457 
Off Fax: +224-41-2025 
Mob: +224-011-212-247 
GUINEA BISSAU  ALL  Makarem    Off Tel: +245-20-1135 
Off Fax: +245-20-1057 
Mob: +34-9-61-665-0353 
IVORY COAST  ALL  Jean-philippe Ducrest 




Off Tel: +225-21-241-459 
Off Fax: +225-21-242-506 
Mob: +225-07-690-021 
Res: +225-22-415-233 
LIBERIA  ALL  Roy Chalkley  rchalkley@afrlink.com  
umarco@libnet.net  
Off Tel: +231-22-6056 / 6472
Off Fax: +231-22-7112 
MAURITANIA  ALL  M. M’ boyrick  sogeco@opt.mr Off Tel: +222-2-54652 
Off Fax: +222-2-53903 
Res: +222-2-52500 
NAMIBIA    Alan Vermaak 
(ISS coordination unit 
based in Cape Town, 
South Africa)  
allan.vermaak@iss-shipping.com Off Tel: +27-21-421-2269 
Off Fax: +27-21-421-2370 
Mob: +27-82-225-1524 
Res: +27-21-557-4887 
NIGERIA  ALL  Sonny Svensson 
Mark Peverett  
SOS.@otal.com 
map.ni@otal.com 
Off Tel: +234-1-587-2925 




SENEGAL  ALL  Papa Mbaye  papa-
ndiaga.mbaye@smtp.saga.fr 
Off Tel: +221-849-3390 
Off Fax: +221-832-5129 
Mob: +221-638-7048 
Res: +221-835-4028 
SIERRA LEONE  ALL  Christian Overgaard 
C.A. Max Williams  
chrslsa@sierratel.sl 
slsa@sierratel.sl 
Off Tel: +232-22-22-3088 
Off Tel: +232-22-22-4656 
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APPENDIX E  
HUSBANDING CONTRACTS - SOUTHWEST ASIA 
      
UPDATED              
20 NOV 2001     
  CONTRACTOR E-MAIL 
      
SOUTH AFRICA N68171-96-D- NONE 
EXPIRED JOHN T. RENNIE AND SONS   
  P.O.C. MR. JAMES WHITE   
      
ERITREA N68171-96-D-A010 N/A 
EXPIRED 
ERITREA SHIPPING & TRANSIT 
SVC   
      
      
KUWAIT N68171-02-D-A001 ganga.allakkot@iss-shipping.com 
30 NOV 02 INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES Chris.Stone@iss-shipping.com 
  P.O.C. MR. CHRIS STONE   
  GEN MANAGER - CHRIS STONE   
      
SAUDI ARABIA - N49400-02-D-A003 ksajub@kanoosa.com 
DAMMAM  AND KANOO SHIPPING AGENCY ksadam@kanoosa.com 
JUBAIL POC:  BABU GEORGE   
30 NOV 02 SUKUMAR MENON   
      
OMAN N68171-97-D-A022 thomasm@issoman.com 
20 JUN  2000 INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES   
  
P.O.C. -  NICK CARPENTER-
FRANK   
      
YEMEN N68171-00-D-A012 MansoobCG@hotmail.com 
EXPIRED 
AL MANSOOB COMMERCIAL 
GROUP Almansoob@y.net.ye 
  P.O.C. -  AHMED AL MANSOOB   
      
SEYCHELLES N68171-99-D-A028 maheship@seychelles.net 
31 JUL 2000 MAHE SHIPPING COMPANY, LTD   
  SHIPPING HOUSE   
  P.O.C. MR. GERRY  ADAM   
      
DOHA, QATAR N68171-02-D-A002 art6999@batelco.com.bh 
30 NOV 02 INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES   
  P.O.C. MR. AKBAR KHAN   
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KENYA N49400-02-D-A006 david.mackay@iss-shipping.co.ke 
30 NOV  2002 
INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES, 
KENYA   
  P.O.C. MR. DAVID MACKAY   
      
BAHRAIN N68171-99-D-A001   
31 OCT  2000 A.R. TOORANI art6999@batelco.com.bh 
  P.O.C. MR. A.R. Toorani   
  or Mr. M Toorani   
      
DJIBOUTI N49400-02-D-A007 iss@intnet.dj 
30 NOV  2002 INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES Ahmed Osman Guelleh 
  
P.O.C. MR. AHMED OSMAN 
GUELLEH   
      
UAE N68171-00-D-A008 akbar.khan@iss-shipping.com 
30 NOV  2000 INCHCAPE SHIPPING SERVICES   
  
MARITIME & MERCANTILE INTL 
L.L.C.   
  P.O.C. MR. AKBAR KHAN   
      
EGYPT N68171-99-D-A121 mitjrson@ritsec3.com.eg 
31 DEC 2000 MITCHELL JR. COMPANY   
  
P.O.C. MR. ADEL ABDOU EL 
LAMEI   
      
SAUDI ARABIA - N68171-97-D-L001 jeddah.ops@gulfagencycompany.com 
JEDDAH  GULF AGENCY COMPANY   
31 MAY  2001 POC:  ABDUL LATIF KHAN   
      
SAUDI ARABIA - N68171-97-D-L005   
YANBU GULF AGENCY COMPANY   
31 MAY  2001 POC:  ABDUL LATIF KHAN   
      
JORDAN, N68171-00-D-A027   
AQABA GULF AGENCY COMPANY   
  POC:  ISSAM KAWAR   
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APPENDIX F  
Country/City Fresh Fruits &Veg. 
Husbanding 
Services Other  
Australia     Five Port Award 
     Melbourne 
& Brisbane FFV Document     
     Cairns FFV Document     
        
Brunei   HSDocument Document 




  HS Document Services 
        
Malaysia  HS Document Document 
        







        
Singapore       
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Thailand   Document Document 
   Phuket 
Spreadsheet 
Document     
   Pattaya 
Document  
Spreadsheet     
        






APPENDIX G  
F. SURVEY SAID FOR WINDOWS AND THE WEB 
 
 








2. Total time in service (years, months):  
 
 
3. Total time in 3044 MOS (years, months):  
 
 
4. Have you done any deployments as a contract specialist not with a MEU? 




5. If you have you done any deployments as a contract specialist not with a 












7. Do you believe 3044s deploy too often, not enough, or just enough?  
Too often  
Not enough  
Just enough  
 




4 or more  
 
9. What dollar value was your warrant for each deployment?  
 
 
10. As MEU contract specialist did you write any contracts that exceeded the 
simplified acquisition threshold of $100,000? If your authority was less than 




11. Did the MEU SupO or any other organic MEU personnel also have a 
contracting warrant? If so, what dollar amount?  
 
 
12. Did the Amphibious Ready Group ships split up during your 
deployment? If so did this cause you to be separated from the MEU SupO?  
 
 
13. How did you feel about your workload as a MEU contract specialist?  
I was in over my head  
It was among the most challenging assignments I have had in the Marine 
Corps  
It was moderately challenging  
It was just right  
I was constantly looking for things to occupy my time  
My talents were completely wasted  
 
14. What most accurately reflects your desire to go back out on another 
deployment as a MEU contract specialist?  
Would seek out an opportunity  
Happy with some reservations  
No strong feeling, just another billet  
Would rather not  
Would get out of the Corps first  
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15. Which most accurately reflects you attitude about recommending a tour 
with a MEU to your fellow 3044s?  
Would highly encourage another 3044 to go out with a MEU  
Would encourage it  
No opinion  
Would not encourage  
Would fully discourage  
 
16. What difficulties if any did you have contracting in support of a MEU?  
 
 
Click Here to Send 
 
97 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST  
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Fort Belvoir, Virginia                                           
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
3. Marine Corps Representative 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
4. Director, Training and Education, MCCDC, Code C46 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center, MCCDC, Code C40RC 
 Quantico, Virginia 
 
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity (Attn: Operations Officer) 
Camp Pendleton, California 
 
7. Professor Jeffrey R. Cuskey  
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
8. Professor David V. Lamm (Code GB/Lt) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
